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Abstract
Design and Cryptanalysis of a Customizable Authenticated Encryption Algorithm
Matthew Joseph Kelly
Supervising Professors: Alan Kaminsky & Marcin Łukowiak
It is common knowledge that encryption is a useful tool for providing confidentiality. Authentica-
tion, however, is often overlooked. Authentication provides data integrity; it helps ensure that any
tampering with or corruption of data is detected. It also provides assurance of message origin. Au-
thenticated encryption (AE) algorithms provide both confidentiality and integrity / authenticity by
processing plaintext and producing both ciphertext and a Message Authentication Code (MAC). It
has been shown too many times throughout history that encryption without authentication is gener-
ally insecure. This has recently culminated in a push for new authenticated encryption algorithms.
There are several authenticated encryption algorithms in existence already. However, these
algorithms are often difficult to use correctly in practice. This is a significant problem because
misusing AE constructions can result in reduced security in many cases. Furthermore, many existing
algorithms have numerous undesirable features. For example, these algorithms often require two
passes of the underlying cryptographic primitive to yield the ciphertext and MAC. This results in a
longer runtime. It is clear that new easy-to-use, single-pass, and highly secure AE constructions are
needed. Additionally, a new AE algorithm is needed that meets stringent requirements for use in
the military and government sectors.
This thesis explores the design and cryptanalysis of a novel, easily customizable AE algorithm
based on the duplex construction. Emphasis is placed on designing a secure pseudorandom permu-
tation (PRP) for use within the construction. A survey of state of the art cryptanalysis methods is
performed and the resistance of our algorithm against such methods is considered. The end result
is an algorithm that is believed to be highly secure and that should remain secure if customizations
are made within the provided guidelines.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The overarching goal of cryptography is to enable people to communicate privately over an inse-
cure channel in the presence of adversaries. This notion may be abstracted further; for example, the
sending and receiving party may be the same person writing to and reading from a storage medium
over time. Two requirements for achieving this goal are encryption and authentication. Encryp-
tion provides confidentiality while authentication provides data integrity and assurance of message
origin.
Encryption without authentication has been shown to be insecure in practical instances several
times in recent history. For example, Wireless Equivalence Privacy (WEP), an algorithm for “se-
curing” communications over wireless networks, is badly broken due (in part) to a lack of proper
authentication [1]. In fact, it is so badly broken that people with no cryptographic expertise can use
existing tools on standard consumer machines to break into networks that use 104-bit WEP in less
than 60 seconds [2].
Another example of a flaw in prevalent systems due to a lack of proper authentication came in
2002. An attack was found on the CBC mode of encryption employed by protocols such as SSL
and IPSEC. The attack could have been avoided had an authenticated encryption scheme been used
[3].
1.1 Motivation
Many authenticated encryption algorithms are in existence today, but they are often unsatisfactory
in terms of performance, security, or ease of use. Some algorithms require two passes per block of
plaintext to encrypt and authenticate. This is generally undesirable because it often means a much
slower algorithm. Other algorithms have been shown to be insecure or difficult to use properly.
Many algorithms, such as the ones based on generic composition, require two keys. This should be
avoided when possible because key management is a difficult problem.
Furthermore, a new authenticated encryption algorithm is required that meets the stringent re-
quirements of government and military applications. Such algorithms are not typically in the public
domain. The goal of this is partially to reduce or eliminate academic interest in cryptanalyzing the
algorithm and publishing results. This stance is highly controversial. Still, the security of such
algorithms depends entirely on the secrecy of the key and not on the secrecy of the algorithm. The
assumption is still made that the enemy knows the details of the algorithm being used at any time
[4].
For this reason, there is a need for a customizable authenticated encryption algorithm. This
algorithm should remain secure as long as customizations are made within certain guidelines. The
2result is an algorithm which can be made unique on a per-user or per-application basis without the
effort of cryptanalyzing every specific instantiation. We present such an algorithm here. First, it is
important to understand how authenticated encryption has been evolving over the years.
1.2 Overview of Authenticated Encryption
1.2.1 AE Through Generic Composition
The naı¨ve approach to authenticated encryption is generic composition. In this construction, one
simply computes the ciphertext under a given key and computes the MAC under a different key.
These operations can be done in any order or at the same time. There are thus three generic compo-
sition types: Encrypt-and-MAC, MAC-then-Encrypt, and Encrypt-then-MAC. The names here are
straightforward and describe exactly the order of operations. In Encrypt-and-MAC, the encryption
and authentication operations are performed in parallel and the ciphertext and MAC are concate-
nated together at the end. MAC-then-Encrypt computes the MAC, appends it to the plaintext, and
then encrypts the result. Encrypt-then-MAC computes the ciphertext first and then computes the
MAC over the ciphertext.
There is much ongoing debate about which generic composition method is best and each method
has pros and cons in terms of security and performance. As a simple example, consider the perfor-
mance of each method at a high level of abstraction. In Encrypt-and-MAC, the encryption (de-
cryption) and authentication can happen in parallel. If using MAC-then-Encrypt, decryption must
be performed before the MAC can be verified. The MAC can be checked before decryption in the
case of Encrypt-then-MAC, thus saving the performance hit of decryption for messages in which
authentication fails [5].
1.2.2 AE Modes of Operation
There are many existing block cipher modes of operation that provide authenticated encryption. The
main difference between a generic composition and a mode of operation for authenticated encryp-
tion is that a generic composition always requires two keys, while a mode of operation generally
requires only one. This is a huge benefit because key management is a difficult task, so it is desirable
to limit the number of keys required for a cryptographic algorithm.
Patent-Encumbered Modes
The first notable modes of operation for AE were created by Jutla, an IBM researcher, in the year
2000. The two modes are called Integrity Aware Cipher Block Chaining (IACBC) and Integrity
Aware Parallelizable Mode (IAPM) [6]. IACBC, as the name suggests, was inspired by the CBC
mode of operation. This mode is highly serial in nature. IAPM was inspired by the Electronic
Codebook (ECB) mode, which is highly parallelizable but insecure when used directly. Jutla’s
modes are historically noteworthy in that they provide authenticated encryption in a single pass
with minimal overhead; however, they come with many disadvantages. For example, they do not
support additional authenticated data (e.g. headers that are only authenticated, not encrypted). An
even bigger problem is that they are highly patent encumbered. On top of all this, they require two
keys and the underlying block cipher decryption mode. As a result of the lack of popularity, there
has not been much cryptanalysis performed on IACBC or IAPM.
3In 2001, Rogaway et al. [7] introduced a new AE mode called Offset Codebook (OCB) mode.
This mode is based on IAPM, but with many added features. OCB requires only a single key
and provides support for additional authenticated data. Furthermore, it is highly parallelizable and
also a single-pass mode. The main disadvantages of OCB are that it also requires the block cipher
decryption mode and that it is also patent encumbered.
Patent-Free Modes
Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode was created by Whiting et al. in 2003 as a response to OCB’s
patented status [8]. CCM mode is patent-free but has many disadvantages. Like all of the patent-free
modes that will be discussed here, it requires two passes under a single key. It does not, however,
require the decryption mode of the underlying block cipher since it is built on Counter mode. CCM
mode does not support block sizes other than 128 bits and does not support stream processing. This
is a significant disadvantage because stream processing is often exactly what a AE construction is
used for (e.g. streaming network traffic). Rogaway and Wagner present a detailed analysis of all of
the disadvantages of CCM mode in [9].
Carter-Wegman + Counter (CWC) mode was introduced by Kohno et al. in 2004 as an attempt
to improve upon the deficiencies of CCM mode [10]. Like CCM mode, it is a single-key mode
that requires two passes. Unlike CCM, the second pass does not consist of any invocations of
the underlying block cipher. It instead uses what is called a Carter-Wegman (CW) universal hash
function. This CW hash function operates over a prime field and thus requires integer multipliers
which consume a large amount of area when implemented in hardware.
McGrew and Viega created Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in 2004 in an effort to improve upon
the efficiency of CWC mode [11]. Instead of operating in a prime field, GCM performs multipli-
cation in a binary Galois field. As a result, it consumes much less area in hardware. Like all other
patent-free modes described here, it is single-key and two-pass. It should be noted that some people
may argue that GCM is single-pass because only the first pass calls the underlying block cipher.
GCM has seen widespread adoption by the cryptographic community. It is arguably the most used
mode of operation for AE in existence today. Indeed, GCM is a main reason for the advent of Intel’s
carry-less multiplication instruction (PCLMULQDQ) in their 2010 line of processors [12].
EAX mode was introduced in 2004 by Bellare et al. as another alternative to CCM mode [13].
Like CCM mode, it is not parallelizable. Like all other modes listed here, it is single-key and two-
pass. EAX mode is derived from a generic composition called EAX2 by the authors. EAX2 mode
leaves the Pseudorandom Function (PRF) used for MAC computation and the underlying block
cipher mode used for encryption unspecified. EAX2 uses two keys. EAX is a specific instantiation
of EAX2 that uses only a single key. Like GCM, EAX mode has also seen widespread adoption.
1.2.3 Other Existing AE Constructions
Stream Cipher Based
There are two notable stream ciphers that provide authenticated encryption: Helix [14] and Phelix
[15], both from Whiting et al. Phelix is the successor of Helix and was submitted to the recent
eSTREAM competition which was a competition aimed at yielding better stream ciphers. Phelix,
though very fast, is not currently a viable AE candidate because of its vulnerability to differential-
linear attacks as exposed by Wu and Preneel [16]. The security flaw relates to lack of resistance to
4misuse of the stream cipher. Still, new stream cipher based AE constructions are probable in the
future.
Duplex Constructions
The duplex construction is based on a sponge construction and has promising applications to au-
thenticated encryption. This construction has many extremely desirable features. It is single-key,
single-pass, and supports additional authenticated data and intermediate MACs. For these reasons,
the duplex construction forms a foundation for this thesis; see Chapter 3 for an in-depth treatment.
At the time of writing there is a new AE competition going on called CAESAR (Competition
for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness). Of the 57 first-round candi-
dates, there are nine duplex-based submissions that are not withdrawn: Artemia, Ascon, ICEPOLE,
Ketje, Keyak, NORX, PRIMATEs, STRIBOB, and pi-Cipher [17]. It is far too early to tell which of
these, if any, will be found to be secure and efficient enough for practical use. Furthermore, none of
these submissions are readily customizable at an algorithmic level. Therefore they are not suitable
for our purposes.
1.3 Our Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is a novel, customizable authenticated encryption algorithm
based on the duplex construction. This construction is suitable for hardware (e.g. FPGA) imple-
mentation. An itemized list of specific contributions is listed here:
1. Authenticated encryption algorithm specification
(a) Includes customization suggestions and guidelines
2. Software model of the algorithm (C/C++)
(a) Includes various tests and test data generators
(b) Includes GF(216) library for algorithm verification
3. Tool for finding suitable bitwise permutations for algorithm customization (Python)
4. Survey of relevant cryptanalysis techniques and cryptanalysis results
5. Statistical test results
6. Tool for ensuring acceptable distribution of P-values (Python)
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we discuss some mathematical
concepts that are central to this thesis. In addition, we explain the notation used for the remainder
of this document. Chapter 3 explains in detail the sponge and duplex constructions as well as their
resistance to generic attacks. The duplex construction forms the basis for the algorithm designed in
this thesis. In Chapter 4 we provide a full specification for the AE algorithm as well as providing
guidelines for customizations that can be made without reducing our security margin. Cryptanalysis
of our construction is considered in Chapter 5, where we provide a survey of potentially relevant
attacks. A variety of statistical tests and their results for our algorithm are presented in Chapter 6.
Finally, we conclude in Chapter 7 and provide some ideas for future work.
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Mathematical Foundation and Notation
There are several mathematical concepts central to this research that we will briefly explain here.
The notation used in the rest of this thesis is also explained here for clarity.
2.1 Algebraic Structures
2.1.1 Groups
An algebraic group is a set of elements G together with a binary operation ∗ (e.g. multiplication or
addition) that satisfies the following properties:
1. Associativity. The operation is associative, i.e. (a ∗ b) ∗ c = a ∗ (b ∗ c) for all a, b, c ∈ G.
2. Closure. G is closed under ∗; that is, a ∗ b ∈ G for all a, b ∈ G.
3. Identity. There is an element e ∈ G (called the identity) such that a ∗ e = e ∗ a = a for all
a ∈ G.
4. Inverses. For each element a ∈ G there exists an element a−1 ∈ G (called the inverse of a)
such that a ∗ a−1 = a−1 ∗ a = e.
A group may also have the property that a ∗ b = b ∗ a for all a, b ∈ G. In other words, it is
commutative. We call these groups abelian groups. The most common example of a group is
probably Z, the set of integers under addition, where the identity e = 0.
2.1.2 Rings
An algebraic ring is a set of elementsR together with two binary operations · (called multiplication,
with a · b denoted ab for brevity) and + (called addition) that satisfies the following properties:
1. R is an abelian group under addition; its identity is called 0.
2. Associativity. Multiplication and addition are both associative.
3. Distributivity. a(b+ c) = ab+ ac and (b+ c)a = ba+ ca; that is, multiplication distributes
over addition.
A ring is called abelian if multiplication also commutes over it. The most common example of a
ring is also Z, but now with multiplication as well as addition.
62.1.3 Fields
An algebraic field is a set of elements F together with the operations · and + such that:
1. F is an abelian ring.
2. F is an abelian group under multiplication; its identity is called 1.
Groups, rings, and fields (all of which are algebraic structures) may be of finite or infinite
cardinality. The cardinality of an algebraic structure G is called its order and is denoted |G|.
We use an exponential representation as shorthand for applying an operation ∗ to the same
element. For example, a ∗ a ∗ a = a3. For some structure G, the order of an element a ∈ G
is the smallest integer k such that ak = e. For structures of finite order, it is a well-known result
(Lagrange’s theorem) that the order of an element divides the order of the structure [18].
2.1.4 Galois Fields
Finite fields are also commonly referred to as Galois fields (GFs). It is another well-known result
that all Galois fields are of prime power order. A Galois field of order pk is denoted GF(pk) or Fpk ,
where p is prime. p is called the characteristic of the field and it is the smallest positive integer such
that ap = 0. Fields with p = 2 are typically of the most interest to cryptographers, and they are
often called binary Galois fields. k is called the degree of the field.
When the degree of a field is greater than one, its elements can be represented as polynomials
belonging to the set of equivalence classes modulo an irreducible polynomial f(x). The degree of
this polynomial, denoted deg(f(x)), is equal to the degree of the field. We denote a GF of order
pk along with its irreducible polynomial as GF(pk)/ 〈f(x)〉. Elements in the field are represented
using a polynomial basis in the indeterminate x with the form
a = αk−1xk−1 + αk−2xk−2 + . . .+ α1x+ α0,
where αi ∈ Zp. For example, in a binary Galois field we have αi ∈ Z2. Since operations in the GF
are done modulo f(x), any element a ∈ GF(pk) must satisfy deg(a) < k.
For a binary Galois field we often represent elements in binary or hex format, as this is how
they will be implemented in practice. For example, consider the element x15 + x3 + x2 + 1 in
GF(216). This element can be represented in hex as 0x800d, where the most-significant bit (MSB)
corresponds to x15.
Addition in finite fields is done by performing element-wise addition over Zp. In a binary
Galois field, this is equivalent to the bitwise XOR operation. Multiplication is performed by doing
polynomial multiplication as usual and then reducing modulo f(x) if needed. There are methods of
optimizing this operation in both software and hardware.
Interpreting binary strings as elements of a binary Galois field is only useful for certain opera-
tions. Other times, we interpret portions of our state as arbitrary bitstrings for which certain other
operations are defined.
2.2 Bitstrings
Bitstrings are strings of elements in Z2; in other words, they are binary strings. We say s ∈ Zn2
if s is a bitstring of length n. Z∗2 indicates bitstrings of arbitrary but finite length and Z∞2 denotes
7bitstrings of infinite length.
2.2.1 Operations
There are several relevant operations we define for bitstrings:
• bsc` indicates the truncation of a bitstring s to ` bits
• s||t indicates the concatenation of bitstrings s and t, with the resulting length being |s|+ |t|
• s≪ r indicates the logical left rotation of bitstring s by r bits
• s≫ r indicates the logical right rotation of bitstring s by r bits
• s ⊕ t indicates the exclusive-or (XOR, or bitwise addition modulo 2) of bitstrings s and t,
where |s| = |t| is assumed
• HW(s) indicates the Hamming weight of bitstring s
• HD(s, t) indicates the Hamming distance between bitstrings s and t, where |s| = |t| is
assumed
The Hamming weight of a string is defined as the number of nonzero elements it contains. The
Hamming distance between two strings is the number of elements that differ between them. Note
that for elements of Zn2 ,
HD(s, t) = HW(s⊕ t).
For this work, a bitstring of length 16 is called a word. The state of our cryptosystem, as we will
see, is an element of Z5122 that may be considered at times as the concatenation of 32 contiguous
words. Where it matters, the MSB will be specified for a given operation.
2.3 Shannon’s Information Theory
It is widely recognized that Claude Shannon laid the foundation for modern symmetric key cryp-
tography in the late 1940s through two seminal papers on information theory and secrecy systems.
His major relevant contributions include the notions of entropy, confusion, and diffusion [19][20].
2.3.1 Entropy
Entropy, as defined by Shannon, is the measure of the amount of information in some message M .
It is denoted as H(M) and is quantitatively defined as
H(M) = log2 n,
where n is the number of possible meanings of the message. For example, the entropy of a message
containing only information about what month it is is log2(12) ≈ 3.58 since there are 12 months.
Another way to look at this is that exactly d3.58e = 4 bits are required to minimally encode in
binary what month it is.
8Entropy also measures uncertainty. The uncertainty of a message M is the number of plaintext
bits needed to be recovered from ciphertext in order to learn the plaintext. For example, if we know
that the plaintext is either “HEADS” or “TAILS” when provided with the ciphertext “ASDFQJWE”,
then the uncertainty is unity. We need only learn one bit (if chosen correctly) to learn the plaintext.
We often discuss the entropy of cryptosystems with respect to their key space. For example, a
symmetric key system with a 128-bit key should have an entropy of 128 bits.
2.3.2 Transformations
A transformation is simply a function
t : X → Y,
where X is the domain and Y is the codomain. Some transformations on a space are entropy-
preserving; that is, if an input x has entropy H(x) before the transformation, it has the exact
same entropy (and thus uncertainty) after the transformation. An obvious requirement for entropy-
preserving transformations is that they are bijective. We call a bijective transformation in which
the domain is equal to the codomain a permutation. This notion is of central importance to the
remainder of this thesis.
2.3.3 Confusion and Diffusion
Also of central importance to this thesis are Shannon’s qualitative notions of confusion and dif-
fusion. Confusion is a generic method used to obscure the relationship between the plaintext and
ciphertext. For example, substitution provides confusion. Diffusion is a generic method that aims to
dissipate the redundancy of plaintext throughout the ciphertext. For example, bitwise permutations
provide diffusion. In theory, extremely large-scale substitutions are sufficient to create a secure
symmetric key system. However, in practical block cipher systems both confusion and diffusion are
required for efficiency reasons [21].
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Sponge and Duplex Constructions
Our algorithm is based on the duplex construction, a highly flexible new cryptographic primitive
derived from the sponge construction with promising applications to authenticated encryption. We
describe both the sponge and duplex constructions in this chapter and provide details about resis-
tance to generic attacks.
3.1 Sponge Construction
The sponge construction is a relatively new cryptographic primitive that has gained popularity since
KECCAK won the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-3) competition in 2013 [22][23]. Essentially, it
provides a way to generalize hash functions (which normally have outputs of fixed length) to func-
tions with arbitrary length output. This generalization allows cryptographic sponges to be used for
applications other than hashing. We present a few here but there are numerous more possibilities.
The sponge construction is stateless; there is no information stored between calls to it.
Sponges are based on the iteration of an underlying function f . This function can either be a
general transformation or a permutation. A transformation need not be bijective; that is, it may not
be invertible. A permutation is bijective and thus invertible by definition. The security proofs are
different for transformations versus permutations, and there are advantages and disadvantages for
each choice of a function type [24].
3.1.1 Sponge Parameters
The output Z of the parameterized sponge construction is given as
Z = sponge[f,pad, r](M, `),
where pad is a padding function for the input, r is the rate of absorption, M is the message (or
other input) data, and ` is the desired output length.
Figure 3.1 shows the sponge construction. It is split into two distinct phases: the absorbing
phase and the squeezing phase. This is where the term “sponge” comes from. Inputs (e.g. message
and/or key material) are absorbed in the first phase and the output (e.g. a MAC or keystream) is
squeezed out in the second phase.
The state of the sponge construction is split into two contiguous portions: the outer state, which
is accessible externally, and the inner state, which is hidden. The size of the outer state is given by
the rate r and the size of the inner state is specified by the capacity c. The size of the entire state is
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Figure 3.1: The sponge construction sponge[f,pad, r] [24]
b = r + c. The speed of the construction partially relies on the rate, while the security is partially
dependent on the capacity (see Section 3.1.3).
The padding function pad is first applied to M to make it a multiple of r. M is then absorbed
r bits at a time. More concretely, absorption is the process of XORing r-bit blocks into the state
while interleaving with applications of the underlying sponge function f . If the rate is increased,
then more bits are absorbed at a time and thus the construction runs faster. However, increasing
the rate means that the capacity must decrease and so there is a clear trade-off between speed and
security. Squeezing consists of concatenating r bits at a time to an output bitstringZ that is truncated
to ` bits. The sponge function f must be called once for each r bits of output after the first full block.
Simplified Sponge
A padding function is required for the classical sponge construction in order to ensure that inputs
can be reformed into bitstrings with length equal to a multiple of r. Two basic requirements of a
padding function are that it be reversible and that it never produce identical outputs for different
inputs. We omit the lower level details of good padding functions here for brevity and refer the
interested reader to [24] instead.
It is also useful, as we will see, to consider a sponge construction in which no padding function
pad is required. The parameterized interface for such a construction becomes
Z = sponge[f, r](M, `).
Alternatively, we can say that pad exists but it is trivially given as
pad(M) = M.
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This lets us remain aligned with the original definition. In either case, we assume that any necessary
padding is performed at some higher level in the overall system. This simplification allows us to
focus more design effort towards the underlying sponge function f and ignore the details of padding.
3.1.2 Applications
Hashing
The sponge construction was originally envisioned as a generalization of hash functions to functions
with arbitrary length output. Using the sponge construction for hashing is straightforward. We
denote a hash function by
H : Z∗2 → Z`2,
where ` is the desired length of the message digest. In this case, the message M is padded and
absorbed as usual. After absorption completes, the construction switches to squeezing mode and
the state is squeezed until a message digest of length ` is acquired.
Without any structural changes, several other applications can be derived from the sponge con-
struction. These following applications are of considerable relevance to the ultimate goal of authen-
ticated encryption.
MAC Generation
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) function is essentially a keyed hash function. We denote a
MAC function under a given key K and initialization vector IV by
MACK,IV : Zk2 × Zv2 × Z∗2 → Z`2,
where k is the length of the key, v is the length of the IV, and ` is the desired length of the tag
(MAC). In this case, K||IV is absorbed first and then the padded message is absorbed directly after
as usual. Squeezing works the same as in a hash computation. Note that the sponge construction
is particularly attractive here (and in general with keyed modes) because to the sponge, there is no
differentiation between the key, IV, and message data. All input data is treated exactly the same, and
thus the design remains simple. This is in great contrast to traditional symmetric key cryptosystem
design in which a key schedule is required.
Bitstream Encryption
The previous two direct applications of the sponge construction were characterized by long absorb-
ing phases (assuming a long message) and short squeezing phases. Bitstream encryption, i.e. using
the sponge as a stream cipher, is characterized oppositely: absorbing is quick while squeezing is
likely a much longer process. We denote a stream cipher under a given key K and initialization
vector IV by
STREAMK,IV : Zk2 × Zv2 → Z∞2 ,
where k is the length of the key and v is the length of the IV. The codomain of such a stream cipher
is the set of infinite bitstreams; in practice, the output is truncated to provide just enough keystream
material to encrypt a given message M . For this application, we simply absorb K||IV and switch
to the squeezing phase immediately. Squeezing continues until a keystream is no longer needed.
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The keystream is XORed with the message to produce the ciphertext. Notice again how the overall
structure of the algorithm remains the same as it was for its original application of hashing.
3.1.3 Generic Security
It is typical to employ Kerckhoffs’ principle when discussion the security of a cryptosystem. This
principle states that a cryptosystem should be secure regardless of any knowledge the adversary may
have about the system (excluding the key). Stated in a different way, the adversary is assumed to
know every detail of the system except for the key [25]. Indeed, we even presume that an attacker
has access to the cryptosystem. In the case of a sponge construction, the adversary knows f (and
f−1 if f is a permutation). The easiest way for him or her to gain knowledge about f that may
differentiate it from a random transformation is to simply make calls to it (and f−1 if a permutation)
[24].
A random oracle model is often useful as a framework for security proofs. A random oracle
(RO), which lies at the core of most sponge security proofs, is a theoretical ideal function
RO : Z∗2 → Z∞2
such that every bit of the output, for every possible input, is chosen uniformly and independently.
We state security proofs in the context of indistinguishability in the random oracle model. We sup-
pose that an adversary is able to query both a random oracle and the pseudorandom function (PRF)
that we are testing. The adversary then decides which of the systems is the PRF. If it is “hard” for
the adversary to do this, then the PRF is called indistinguishable from random. This is what we
desire. Hardness is given in terms of computational complexity and is subject to interpretation. For
example, if the adversary is able to accurately distinguish the two systems after only 240 queries,
then the PRF is not indistinguishable from random since a complexity of 240 is computable with
today’s technology. If, however, it takes a minimum of 2128 queries, then the system is indistinguish-
able from random since this is not computable (i.e. such a computation would not finish within any
reasonable time frame) and will not be computable in the foreseeable future [25].
The security of the sponge construction is based on the assumption that the underlying sponge
function f is secure. That is, if f is indistinguishable from random then so should be the sponge
construction it is instantiated within. Consequently, cryptographers designing a system based on the
sponge construction need only be concerned with designing and cryptanalyzing a secure underlying
function. The sponge construction, when used properly, is said to be secure against generic attacks
– attacks which do not exploit any specific properties of the underlying sponge function. We call
this the generic security of the construction [24].
3.1.4 Security of Keyed Sponges
The generic security of keyed constructions is higher than unkeyed. For our purposes we are inter-
ested only in the security of the keyed sponge construction where a permutation is used for f .
In [26] it is proven that the advantage of distinguishing a keyed permutation-based sponge from
a random oracle is
max
(
1− exp
(
−
M2
2 + 2MN
2c
)
,
N
2|K|
)
,
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where M is the data complexity, N is the time complexity, c is the capacity, and |K| is the size of
the key. The advantage is the probability of success of a generic attack.
We can take N as the number of queries to the permutation f and its inverse. The data com-
plexity M is typically considered to be upper bounded by the implementation under a given key K.
For example, it is very reasonable and common practice to enforce that no more than, say, M = 240
operations be performed under a given key. In [26] this exponent is called a usage exponent and is
denoted as a. The assumption is made that a  c/2 and the requirement (as is typical) is that no
attacks are faster than a brute force search on the keyspace. This ultimately leads to our metric of
interest: a lower bound on the capacity c such that there are no generic attacks (that allow differ-
entiation from a random oracle) that are faster than exhausitive search. This lower bound is given
as
c ≥ |K|+ a+ 1.
Jovanovic et. al [27] further improved on these results in 2014 by proving that the generic
security level of keyed sponge constructions is lower bounded by
min(2(r+c)/2, 2c, 2|K|).
3.2 Duplex Construction
The duplex construction is highly related to the sponge construction. The main differences are that
the duplex construction maintains state between calls and that there no longer exists a clear separa-
tion between the absorbing and squeezing phases. Absorbing and squeezing happen essentially at
the same time, hence “duplexing”. Other than this, switching from the sponge to the duplex con-
struction is simply a matter of adjusting how inputs and outputs are handled. The duplex mode has
several applications, with authenticated encryption being the one of obvious interest to us.
3.2.1 Duplex Parameters
Parameters for the duplex construction are mostly the same as for the sponge construction. However,
since the duplex construction maintains state, we build a duplex object D and make calls to it. The
function which processes inputs and produces outputs is called duplexing:
Zi = D.duplexing(σi, `i)
Figure 3.2 shows the duplex construction. The i-th input is denoted σi and the i-th output is
denoted Zi, which is truncated to `i bits. Inputs are absorbed and processed at the same time that
outputs are squeezed. For a duplex object it is possible to have an empty input or to not request an
output. A blank call is a call to duplexing for which no input is provided (|σi| = 0). A mute call
is a call for which no output is requested (`i = 0). The reasons for these types of calls will soon be
apparent.
Simplified Duplex
In addition to the padding required for the sponge construction, the duplex construction also re-
quires domain separation. This can be generally defined as a mechanism that allows differentiation
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Figure 3.2: The duplex construction duplex[f,pad, r] [24]
between varying types of inputs (e.g. between header and body data). In other words, it eliminates
ambiguity on the receiving end that naturally arises from support for arbitrary length inputs. The
KECCAK designers use a frame bit appended to the end of every input (see Figure 3.3) in their orig-
inal definition of the duplex construction [28]. The value of this bit toggles for every input type so
that the receiver can differentiate between outputs. Since the order of the inputs (and thus outputs)
is always the same, a single frame bit is sufficient.
We also note that a frame bit is not the only way to achieve domain separation. In general one
can append a frame string, denoted γi, to the end of every input. The only requirements are that
|γi| ≥ 1 and γi 6= γi+1 for all i. For example, each frame string could be a byte instead of a single
bit.
For the simplified duplex construction, we can make the assumption that both the padding and
domain separation are accomplished at some higher level if needed. This again allows us to focus
more design effort towards the underlying sponge function.
3.2.2 Duplex for Authenticated Encryption
Authenticated encryption is easily achieved using the duplex construction. It can be modeled under
a given key K as
AEK : Zk2 × (Z∗2)2 → Z∗2 × Z`2,
where k is the length of the key and ` is the length of the MAC desired.
Figure 3.3 shows the duplex construction being used in an AE use case. Frame bits are shown,
but recall that these are ignored in the simplified duplex construction. First, we construct a duplex
objectD. Then we absorbK (or optionallyK||IV ) using one or more mute calls toD.duplexing.
More that one mute call may be required if the length of the key exceeds the rate r. We denote a
header input toD as A; these arbitrary length inputs are authenticated but not encrypted. We denote
a body input to D as B; these arbitrary length inputs are both encrypted and authenticated. A inputs
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are absorbed using one or more mute calls to D.duplexing. B inputs are absorbed in a similar
fashion and then the keystream Z is XORed with B to produce the ciphertext C. The tag T is
produced using a blank call to D.duplexing after all header and body inputs have been processed.
Figure 3.3: The duplex construction as used for authenticated encryption [29]
A more general case is shown in a slightly modified view in Figure 3.4. In this view, the duplex
object D is shown as a block and the different header and body inputs (Ai and Bi respectively) are
absorbed over a series of calls to D.duplexing. For example, the body B consists of three blocks
of size r and so it requires three calls to be completely absorbed. An intermediate tag is requested
after the first header and body pair is processed and before the next header begins. This is a very
typical use case for e.g. network traffic. The tag can be of arbitrary length.
Figure 3.4: The duplex construction as used for authenticated encryption (general case) [29]
Clearly, the ciphertext and tags produced at any point depend on all of the previous inputs to D.
Intermediate tags can be produced if desired, since blank calls can be made at any time. In summary,
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using the duplex construction for authenticated encryption provides the following advantages:
1. Easy to use
2. Single key required
3. Single-pass for encryption and authentication
4. Support for intermediate tags
5. Support for Additional Authenticated Data (AAD, or headers)
6. Secure against generic attacks
7. Ability to trade off speed and security by adjusting r
The main disadvantage to using the duplex construction for AE is that it is not easily parallelizable
as given here. This should not be a concern most of the time since data (e.g. IP traffic) is often
received and sent in a serial fashion for AE applications. Compared to other methods of achieving
AE, the duplex construction is clearly superior in the majority of applications.
3.2.3 Security
A reduction is used to prove the security of the duplex construction. Any calls made to the duplex
construction can be reduced to calls to the keyed sponge construction. Therefore the security of
the duplex depends on the security of the corresponding sponge, which can be shown to be secure
against generic attacks. For a concrete example, consider the i-th duplexing call to a duplex object
D:
Zi = D.duplexing(σi, `i)
= sponge(pad(σ0) || pad(σ1) || . . . || pad(σi))
Or in the case of a simplified duplex object D, we have:
Zi = D.duplexing(σi, `i)
= sponge(σ0 || σ1 || . . . || σi),
where σi may be key, header, or body material. Since this is true in general, it is clear that the duplex
reduces to the sponge. For a more rigorous proof, we refer to [28].
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Chapter 4
Algorithm Specification
Our authenticated encryption algorithm is based on the simplified duplex construction. Padding and
domain separation are assumed to be done at some higher level in the overall system if needed. For
this reason, it is sufficient to specify only the duplex parameters and the sponge function f .
For Known Answer Tests (KATs) corresponding to this specification, see Appendix D.
4.1 Duplex Parameters
We allow two key sizes: 128 bits and 256 bits. These are the NIST recommended symmetric key
sizes as of 2011 [30]. Our construction uses a 512-bit internal state, so we have b = 512. The rate
r is 128 bits for both key lengths, which means that the capacity c is 384. Keeping the rate at a
constant 128 bits for both instantiations means that switching between key lengths is a trivial task.
The capacity c = 384 provides sufficient security against generic attacks for both 128- and
256-bit keys. As explained in Chapter 3, we know from [27] that the generic security level is
min(2(r+c)/2, 2c, 2|K|).
For a 128-bit key, the security level is 2128. For a 256-bit key, the security level is 2256.
4.2 Permutation f
Our underlying sponge function f is a permutation, so it has the advantage of being fully entropy-
preserving. Since it is bijective, f−1 exists by definition. We specify both f and f−1 here. While
f−1 is never used in practice, it may be useful for cryptanalysis and verification purposes.
The permutation consists of a number of rounds. Figure 4.1 shows a diagram of a single round
of the forward permutation. Figure 4.2 shows a single inverse round. Each round can be represented
as the composition of several subfunctions or steps: a substitution, a bitwise permutation, a mixing
layer, and the addition of a round constant. These are represented respectively as S, pi, M, and ⊕ in
the diagrams.
4.2.1 Substitution Step
The substitution step is a bricklayer permutation that uses 32 identical, bijective 16 × 16 S-boxes.
This step is the main source of confusion within the permutation. Furthermore, it is the only non-
linear step, as is typical with most substitution-based symmetric key algorithms [25].
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Figure 4.1: A single round of the sponge permutation f . Each line represents a 16-bit word.
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Figure 4.2: An inverse round of the permutation f . Each line represents a 16-bit word.
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To the best of our knowledge this is the first cryptosytem to use such large S-boxes. We believe
that, at the time of writing, the largest S-boxes used in the literature are the 8× 8 bijective S-boxes
used by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [31][32].
Our S-box is an AES-inspired design taken directly from Wood’s thesis on the subject [33]. The
primary reason for using this particular class of 16-bit S-boxes is that they are efficiently imple-
mentable in hardware. Rather than being based on a random mapping, they are based on multiplica-
tive inversion in a finite field followed by an affine transformation. This allows us to implement an
actual circuit which performs the operations rather than use the corresponding (and prohibitively
large) look-up table.
Specifically, we use the reference C implementation provided in Appendix C of the aforemen-
tioned thesis. This S-box is based on multiplicative inversion in GF(216)/ 〈p(x)〉 where
p(x) = x16 + x5 + x3 + x+ 1.
We represent an input to the S-box (and inverse S-box) as a 16-bit column vector
x =
(
x15 x14 . . . x1 x0
)T
,
where x15 is the MSB. Using this notation, the forward S-box function is given as
S(x) =

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0


x15
x14
x13
x12
x11
x10
x9
x8
x7
x6
x5
x4
x3
x2
x1
x0

−1
⊕

0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1

and the inverse is
S−1(x) =


0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1


x15
x14 ⊕ 1
x13
x12
x11
x10 ⊕ 1
x9
x8 ⊕ 1
x7 ⊕ 1
x6
x5 ⊕ 1
x4 ⊕ 1
x3
x2 ⊕ 1
x1 ⊕ 1
x0 ⊕ 1


−1
.
21
A hardware implementation for this particular S-box requires just 1238 XOR gates and 144
AND gates. However, No concrete implementation (e.g. in VHDL) is provided; this is an area for
future work.
4.2.2 Bitwise Permutation Step
Bitwise permutations are easily implementable in hardware via a simple rerouting of wires. Com-
pared to a permutation on the words of the state, a bitwise permutation intuitively provides much
better diffusion. The bitwise permutation step is the main source of long-range (i.e. across the entire
state) diffusion in the algorithm.
The bitwise permutation also helps maximize the minimum number of active S-boxes by being
subject to certain constraints. We use a permutation that satisfies the following properties:
1. All outputs of a given S-box go to 16 different mixers
2. The permutation is a derangement; it has no fixed points
3. High order; it does not repeat within the number of rounds
4. No low order bits; the order of any bit equals the order of the overall permutation
5. Easily definable by some function
There is obviously no cryptographic significance to how “easy” it is to express a bitwise permuta-
tion. This is merely to cut down on the search space and to avoid having to provide a table with 512
entries to express the permutation.
We denote the bitwise permutation function
pi : Z512 → Z512,
where it operates on the index of a given bit, x ∈ Z512.
To understand our specific choice of pi, it is useful to consider a poor choice first. For this we
can turn our attention to the lightweight block cipher PRESENT which operates on a 64-bit state
over 31 rounds. PRESENT uses the bitwise permutation
piP : Z63 → Z63
given by the linear function
piP (x) = 16x mod 63.
Since it operates in Z63, an augmented mapping piP (63) = 63 is required for the last bit [34].
The particular structure of piP led to an attack on PRESENT in 2009 [35]. The attack leverages
the following undesirable properties of piP :
1. There are four fixed points: x = 0, 21, 41, 63
2. The order is only three: pi3P (x) = piP (x)
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The combination of these properties results in a decrease in the lower bound on the number of active
S-boxes across four rounds since it is possible to construct a trail that branches back into itself after
piP is iterated only three times. See Figure A.1 for a diagram that illustrates this trail.
A simple way to avoid fixed points is to use an affine function rather than a linear function. An
affine function over Z512 is of the form
pi(x) = αx+ β mod 512.
For pi to be bijective, we require gcd(α, 512) = 1. Since the prime factorization of 512 is simply
29, it is equivalent to say that α must be odd [25].
A low order bit is defined as a bit that has order less than the order of the overall bitwise permu-
tation. It is cumbersome to mathematically characterize all permutations that satisfy the property
that no bits have low order. Instead, we wrote a script (see Appendix E) to search for such per-
mutations. The script also identifies if a given permutation satisfies all other properties that we
require. We found 384 permutations defined by affine functions over Z512 that satisfy all properties.
A complete listing is provided in Table B.1.
We chose the following permutation to use for our algorithm since it is the first function to
satisfy all properties:
pi(x) = 31x+ 15 mod 512
This particular bitwise permutation has order 32 and its inverse is given by
pi−1(x) = 479(x− 15) mod 512
since 31−1 ≡ 479 in Z512.
4.2.3 Mix Step
The purpose of the mix step is to provide local diffusion (i.e. across two words) and increase the
linear and differential branch numbers of a round from two to three. See Chapter 5 for more detail
on branch numbers. We use a mixer based on multiplication by a 2× 2 matrix in GF(216) modulo
the irreducible polynomial
p(x) = x16 + x5 + x3 + x2 + 1.
The mixer takes two words A and B as input and produces outputs A′ and B′ as follows:(
A′
B′
)
=
(
1 x
x x+ 1
)(
A
B
)
The mix step is invertible because the matrix is invertible; its inverse is given by(
A
B
)
=
(
a b
b c
)(
A′
B′
)
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where
a = x15 + x14 + x12 + x11 + x9 + x8 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x+ 1
b = x14 + x13 + x11 + x10 + x8 + x7 + x5 + x4 + x3 + 1
c = x15 + x13 + x12 + x10 + x9 + x7 + x6 + x3 + x.
This can be verified by using the provided GF(216) C library. The MSB of each word is taken as
the leftmost bit and is represented by x15.
The forward mixer is efficiently implementable in hardware. Notice that the outputs A′ and B′
can be written as
A′ = A⊕Bx
B′ = Ax⊕Bx⊕B
since addition in GF(216) is simply the XOR operation. Figure 4.3 shows how this matrix multipli-
cation is implemented.
A B
x∗ x∗
A′ B′
Figure 4.3: Hardware implementation of the forward mixer function.
The x∗ operation is a multiplication by x in GF(216). Its implementation, which is shown in
Figure 4.4, is very simple. Notice that a multiplication by x is simply a left rotation followed by a
reduction if the MSB was one. The reduction is derived from the fact that
x16 ≡ x5 + x3 + x2 + 1 mod p(x)
for our particular irreducible polynomial p(x), and it is implementable using just three XOR gates.
4.2.4 Add Round Constant Step
The add round constant step is the simplest by far, and it is its own inverse. A constant 512-bit value
is added to the state using bitwise XOR in order to disrupt symmetry and prevent slide attacks. The
round constant RCi for round i is given by the formula
RCi = SHA3-512(ASCII(i)),
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Figure 4.4: Hardware implementation of the x∗ function. The leftmost bit is the MSB.
where ASCII(i) is a function that provides the one or two byte ASCII representation of i and
SHA3-512 is the SHA-3 hash function that outputs a 512-bit message digest. Table 4.1 provides
the values of RCi up to i = 16.
4.3 Number of Rounds
This algorithm uses 10 rounds for a 128-bit key and 16 rounds for a 256-bit key. The number of
rounds is determined, as is typical with block ciphers and permutations, by calculating the number
needed for resistance to linear and differential cryptanalysis and adding some buffer to increase the
security margin. For a more in-depth treatment, refer to Chapter 5.
4.4 Customization
While a specific instantiation is specified here, our algorithm is highly customizable within our
security margin. This could be useful in the case that different users want unique, proprietary
algorithms. We list several possible customizations here.
4.4.1 State Initialization
In the given specification, the inner state (like the outer state) is initialized to zero. This is not
a requirement; indeed, the inner state could be initialized to any 384-bit value. Each user could
generate their own unique value to set during the initialization phase. This happens before the first
mute calls that absorb the key.
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Constant Hex Value
RC1
00197a4f5f1ff8c356a78f6921b5a6bfbf71df8dbd313fbc5095a55de756bfa1
ea7240695005149294f2a2e419ae251fe2f7dbb67c3bb647c2ac1be05eec7ef9
RC2
ac3b6998ac9c5e2c7ee8330010a7b0f87ac9dee7ea547d4d8cd00ab7ad1bd5f5
7f80af2ba711a9eb137b4e83b503d24cd7665399a48734d47fff324fb74551e2
RC3
ce4fd4068e56eb07a6e79d007aed4bc8257e10827c74ee422d82a29b2ce8cb07
9fead81d9df0513bb577f3b6c47843b17c964e7ff8f4198f32027533eaf5bcc1
RC4
5058cb975975ceff027d1326488912e199b79b916ad90a3fe2fd01508cd7d7c0
1bc8aaa4d21a8473fb15f3b151ab9e44172e9ccb70a5ea04495af3ec03b5153e
RC5
84da272d13a44f0898ee4ea53334c255d894cc54d357c55466d760debde482a2
44c128df641e80673a8bc34a1620d880b7965e549f313ddccfd506b073413b87
RC6
bb93aaa23b38ea96c9346ef91e184982bf50e91033f4354ecb20d3c7390c2b41
862e8825ec3d0fee0a6f978881f90728c6748e4aed8b732350075d6c2bdd8e4b
RC7
fe32f3eba76626dedf36622bfdc5ccd33db2f3e0dd7c3c128298ea78c1cc7fee
1a140edb8e57cd5824c7f4b817c0fc94e70da5b9399faaf9a848a46ad30679e9
RC8
952ba02486b818febc0ec98559df27c79357838f011b1e5bc11f2cfb6fc0573e
545978c2bc5b390f44907f8da0dfd68206fe4521f86ba6c879ec1e69caed9533
RC9
b41e6bb4ed20294016399c268da6bf88c89e2dc118a361b3560ee8daed973a8f
9778df40e308c1206fa42f97f3fd3f63d2b4b3b57eb5bcbec6ad64d46216b692
RC10
6954a418cecc43633bd526c2499dfc16b832f58b216b9a8b226a6a0b7918d364
a7939004339de0ba08e2b547e64dc5622e24b0c4f8f415d9e0a84cb94b6c5f3f
RC11
2e4b9ad37091e3e5a218c5e57b33ed3470ba4f31fbcf16424684fdd5cde38e88
9eae3f018b37af58c24ccc8af57abc2c6911408dd20ef6435e4494a3e6599a06
RC12
aa42aca73bd7f8a17e987f281422b266e44f0de1615d2d393c620c8c5a2c80b4
f06178c8455bf98179603f2f1bcb30b2559f282c799e40533b0665f97a2a706a
RC13
969c39ae2dc16834310344c0579d0ffdfde01772dbf9a4cab984953c395d7791
1510f39e5f37295e3611a1d46101460daf731ddbdab1ec1bbc512edc44680d8d
RC14
8a1e6ce31f0b526d884b584aa1a5ae4294fcf85fd2e525f959ed1a54233359c7
c5fece6d24775e7d4a9ad97c2632a3be5b331a8f580f557b269e7b65123a5992
RC15
9bd64a932f09672def04b6a94753a3e4087a1c3895078dc70927fcd774888dfd
400b95fd1c6a0b2a91a1ba44eea09f5163dba4dfa9da7b8eb97d791cab566437
RC16
48401f65c2d2d9e71fe47bd80b28d834eee8fff3be9aa4608cba33e6fedce0b1
693c80cdc36db7f504e4abea23ccc6729a030f5b3e035fb59c2c788215cf84a8
Table 4.1: Round constants for up to 16 rounds
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4.4.2 S-boxes
The AES-inspired S-box used here is efficiently implementable in hardware. There are certainly
many other cryptographically secure 16-bit S-boxes, but randomly generated ones may not be suit-
able for hardware implementation due to size constraints. This is an area for further research. Still,
several other AES-like 16-bit S-boxes are presented in [33]. Any new S-box introduced into the
algorithm shall be analyzed to determine its linear and differential characteristics and the number of
rounds should be adjusted accordingly if necessary.
4.4.3 Bitwise Permutations
The bitwise permutation provided in the specification is subject to the constraints explained before.
There are many permutations that satisfy these constraints. We chose to use a permutation that is
easily definable by an affine function as obtained by our script; this is not a requirement. A user
could generate their own bitwise permutation subject to the given constraints via exhaustive search.
4.4.4 Mixers
Our mixer is based on a specific 2×2 matrix multiplication in GF(216) modulo a specific irreducible
polynomial p(x). Many matrices are expected to satisfy the constraints that we impose. These
constraints are:
1. The matrix should be invertible in GF(216)/ 〈p(x)〉
2. The matrix should have differential and linear branch number equal to three (the maximum
possible; see Chapter 5)
3. The transformation should be efficiently implementable in hardware
Note that the inverse transformation need not be efficiently implementable. Like the addition of a
new S-box, any new mixer (i.e. matrix) introduced to the algorithm should be analyzed to ensure it
meets these constraints. A transformation defined by 2× 2 matrix multiplication that does meet the
second requirement, for example, would lower our security margin and possibly require increasing
the number of rounds significantly.
It should be noted that before settling on a mixer based on matrix multiplication, many mixers
based on modular addition, XOR, and rotation operations were tested. Systems or operations that
rely mainly on these operations are typically called ARX-based. None of the ARX-based mixers
we tested met our requirement of increasing the branch number from two to three. However, for
completeness, we enumerate all of the mixers examined in this work in Appendix C.
4.4.5 Round Constants
The round constants presented here are based on SHA-3 hash values. However, they could be any
values that satisfy the following constraints. Round constants should be:
1. Unique for each round; to prevent against slide attacks
2. Random, pseudorandom, or highly asymmetric; to reduce symmetry in the state
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The round constants are not expected to have any cryptographic significance outside of this. Differ-
ent users can generate their own unique set of round constants without difficulty.
There are also other ways of injecting asymmetry into the algorithm using constants. For exam-
ple, the round constants could actually be rotation constants that define the amount to rotate each
word on the inputs to mixers.
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Chapter 5
Cryptanalysis
We have already discussed the security of this construction against generic attacks in Chapter 3.
The only requirement remaining is to assess the security of the underlying sponge permutation f .
We present a survey of potentially relevant cryptanalysis techniques here. Focus is placed on
differential and linear cryptanalysis since these techniques are so general, powerful, and prevalent.
Resistance against these techniques should result in resistance against many other less general tech-
niques. There is far too much to be said about various cryptanalysis techniques, and there are far too
many to discuss here. Our aim is to provide intuitive explanations of prevalent methods and simply
explain why our permutation should be resistant. Further cryptanalysis, as with all cryptosystems,
is always welcome for future work.
5.1 Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis was publicly introduced by Biham and Shamir in 1991 in their landmark
paper on the subject, [36]. Since then, it has been applied with varying degrees of success to a great
number of cryptosystems. As such, it is a fundamental requirement of symmetric key cryptosystem
design to prove resistance to differential cryptanalysis.
5.1.1 Overview
The goal of differential cryptanalysis is to exploit non-random behavior of a system (in our case, a
permutation) with regard to the propagation of differences. A difference, denoted ∆X , is the bitwise
XOR (for our case) of two bitstrings. For example,
∆X = X ′ ⊕X ′′
is the difference between bitstrings X ′ and X ′′. For differential cryptanalysis, a difference ∆X
is fed through a system and a resulting difference ∆Y is obtained. The pair of these two related
differences is called a differential and is denoted (∆X,∆Y ).
Differentials occur with some associated probability. For an ideal system the probability of a
given differential is 1/2n where n is the length of the bitstrings involved. A system is said to exhibit
non-random behavior if the magnitude of the probability pD for some differential (∆X,∆Y ) is
much greater than the ideal value. This information could be used to mount an attack on the system
[37].
To launch an effective attack, a cryptanalyst first has to focus on the S-boxes. The S-boxes are
analyzed to determine their maximum differential probabilities. Note that in an actual attack, high
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probability 1-bit-to-1-bit differentials are of most interest since these will likely be the easiest to
propagate through the overall system.
A differential trail or characteristic is the propagation of non-zero differentials throughout a
system (i.e. across rounds). Figure A.1 shows an example trail through four rounds of PRESENT.
A differentially active S-box is an S-box that has a non-zero difference at its input during an attack;
it is part of a differential trail. For example, if Figure A.1 shows a differential trail, then there are
six differentially active S-boxes.
Proving resistance against differential cryptanalysis for a substitution-permutation network re-
quires coming up with a lower bound on the minimum number of active S-boxes across some num-
ber of rounds. The more active S-boxes there are, the less likely an attack is to succeed since
exponentially more chosen plaintexts will be needed for additional each active S-box. The branch
number of an operation is of particular importance here. It can be simply defined as the minimum
number of active S-boxes across just two rounds of a system (e.g. our permutation). The technique
of maximizing the branch number of a round is known as the wide trail design strategy. It is the
main design strategy behind AES, which has a round branch number of five [38][31].
The number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs required to mount a successful differential attack should
exceed the number required for a brute force attack. As the differential probability reduces across
rounds, more pairs are required for a successful attack. We loosely refer to the number of pairs
required as the complexity of the differential attack. The number of rounds is increased until this
complexity exceeds that of a brute force method.
5.1.2 Algorithm Resistance
To determine the resistance of our algorithm to differential cryptanalysis, we first have to determine
the maximum differential probability of our S-box. We determined this value to be pD,max = 2−14
using an S-box evaluation program called Eval16BitSboxwritten with Kaminsky’s Parallel Java
2 library [39][40].
Next, it is necessary to determine the branch number of a round. For this, we only need to
analyze the mixer. We purposefully designed a mixer with differential branch number equal to
three, meaning that minimally three S-boxes will be differentially active between two rounds. This
is in fact the maximum achievable branch number for a transformation defined by multiplication
by a 2 × 2 matrix. To verify this, we used a SAT solver called CryptoMiniSat [41]. This SAT
solver takes as input a Boolean equation in conjunctive normal form (CNF) and determines if it is
satisfiable; that is, if it can ever produce an output of ‘1’ for any set of input values. Our CNFs were
generated using Kaminsky’s SatProblem Java class [39]. The Boolean satisfiability problem is
known to be NP-complete [42]; however, our CNFs were small enough that it finished within a
minute for all cases tried (see Appendix C for failed mixer designs).
The CNFs generated are unsatisfiable if and only if the mixer has differential branch number
equal to three since it answers the following question: is it possible to have a difference in only one
input and only one output? Through SAT solver analysis we determined that this is not possible for
our matrix multiplication-based mixer; that is, if there is a non-zero difference in only one input,
there must be a non-zero difference in each output. In the event that there is a difference in both
inputs, there may be a difference in only one output. This still leads to a differential branch number
of three since two S-boxes must have been active in the previous round to lead to those two input
differences. The probability of a difference in either output is pD,out = 2−15.
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With all of this information, it is possible to calculate the number of rounds needed for resistance
to differential attacks. The worst-case probability of successfully propagating a difference over two
rounds is given by
(pD,max)
BD · pD,out,
where BD = 3 is the differential branch number. From this we constructed Table 5.1, which shows
the worst-case differential probabilities for higher numbers of rounds.
Rounds Worse Case Differential Probability
2 2−57
4 2−114
6 2−171
8 2−228
10 2−285
12 2−342
14 2−399
16 2−456
Table 5.1: Worst case differential probabilities over increasing rounds
Therefore the complexity of a differential attack exceeds the complexity of a brute force search
of a 128-bit keyspace at six rounds. To increase our security margin significantly, we require 10
rounds for a 128-bit key. For a 256-bit key, 16 rounds are required to achieve a similar security
margin.
5.2 Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear Cryptanalysis was first introduced by Matsui in 1993 in his landmark paper, [43]. As with
differential cryptanalysis, it is a fundamental requirement of symmetric key cryptosystem design to
prove resistance against linear attacks.
5.2.1 Overview
Linear cryptanalysis is surprisingly similar to differential cryptanalysis in many ways. However,
for linear cryptanalysis we are concerned with estimating the behavior of a system using linear ex-
pressions rather than highly probable differential characteristics. As with differential cryptanalysis,
the first step is to analyze the S-boxes involved in the substitution-permutation network. An S-box,
by definition, should be highly nonlinear to provide sufficient confusion. However, it is possible to
uncover linear approximations of S-box outputs that occur with high (or low) probability. We can
represent our S-box as a vectorial Boolean function
S : Z162 → Z162
in which the input X and output Y are represented as row vectors, e.g.
X =
(
X1 X2 ... X15 X16
)
,
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where Xi ∈ Z2. Favoring typical convention found in the literature, X1 is the MSB [37]. This
notation allows us to easily represent linear approximations in the form(
16⊕
i=1
Xi
)
=
(
16⊕
i=1
Yi
)
or equivalently (
16⊕
i=1
Xi
)
⊕
 16⊕
j=1
Yj
 = 0.
The ideal linear probability p that such an approximation holds true is exactly equal to 1/2.
We are concerned with deviations from this ideal probability, known as the linear bias, . Clearly,
 = p− 1/2. We found the maximum linear bias of our particular S-box to be L,max = 2−8 using
the same program as previously described.
S-boxes that are involved in a linear approximation of a system are called linearly active S-
boxes. A linear approximation across rounds is called a linear trail; it involves several linearly
active S-boxes. Our goal, as with differential cryptanalysis, consists of trying to maximize the
minimum number of linearly active S-boxes. The linear branch number BL is the minimum number
of linearly active S-boxes across two rounds of our permutation. As with differential cryptanalysis,
it depends solely on our mixer.
5.2.2 Algorithm Resistance
Recall that we have verified via SAT solver analysis that the differential branch number of our
mixer is three. In [31], Daemen and Rijmen prove the following result: the linear branch number of
a linear transformation specified by multiplication by a matrix M is equal to the differential branch
number of the linear transformation specified by the transpose of that matrix. Therefore, a sufficient
condition for the differential and linear branch numbers to be equal is that the matrix is symmetric.
Our matrix is symmetric, and therefore we know BD = BL without the need for further analysis.
The final step to prove the resistance of our algorithm against linear cryptanalysis involves
determining the linear bias of two complete rounds of our permutation. To combine linear biases,
we use Matsui’s Piling-Up Lemma from [43]:
 = 2n−1
n∏
i=1
i,
where n = 3 is the number of linearly active S-boxes across two rounds and i = L,max = 2−8 is
the worst case linear bias of those S-boxes. Note that we need not consider the mixer since, being a
linear function, it must have a maximum linear probability pmix = 1, corresponding to a maximum
bias of mix = 1/2. This gets cancelled out. Also from Matsui’s paper, we know that the number of
plaintext/ciphertext pairs (again referred to loosely as the complexity) needed to exploit the overall
bias  is approximately −2. Using this information, we constructed Table 5.2.
Therefore the complexity of a linear attack exceeds the complexity of a brute force search of a
128-bit keyspace at six rounds. To increase our security margin significantly, we require 10 rounds
for a 128-bit key. For a 256-bit key, 16 rounds are required to achieve a similar security margin.
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Rounds Worst Case Linear Bias PT/CT Pairs Required
2 2−22 244
4 2−44 288
6 2−66 2132
8 2−88 2176
10 2−110 2220
12 2−132 2264
14 2−154 2308
16 2−176 2352
Table 5.2: Worst case linear biases and linear attack complexities over increasing rounds
5.3 Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis Variants
There have been numerous efforts to extend on the foundations of differential and linear cryptanal-
ysis over the years in order to produce attacks that are potentially more powerful. We present a brief
overview of the some of the most prevalent variants here.
5.3.1 Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis
As the name suggests, differential-linear cryptanalysis is a combination of differential and linear
cryptanalysis in which a differential trail is followed by a linear trail. It was introduced in 1994
by Langford and Hellman [44], who demonstrated a differential-linear attack on 8-round DES that
requires far fewer plaintexts than previous attacks. The attack is based on a differential trail over the
first three rounds that holds with probability 1 followed by a high magnitude bias linear approxima-
tion for the following rounds. While it was a requirement for this attack to use a unity probability
differential trail over the initial rounds, Biham et al. [45] were able to generalize differential-linear
attacks in 2002 to differential trails with probability less than 1. Recall from Chapter 1 that these
results were used in 2007 by Wu and Praneel [16] to break the stream cipher Phelix, which had
promising applications to authenticated encryption prior to this.
We believe that any differential-linear attack on our permutation f would be limited to a few
rounds at best due to the extremely low maximum differential probability of our S-box. For example,
our absolute worst case differential probability over the first two rounds is bounded by 2−57. Even
without considering the linear approximation that must follow this, the complexity of such an attack
is already approaching the limits of feasibility after these two rounds.
5.3.2 Truncated and Higher-Order Differentials
Both truncated and higher-order differential attacks were introduced in Knudsen’s 1995 paper on
the subject [46]. Knudsen shows that there exist systems which are provably secure against regular
differential attacks yet susceptible to truncated or higher-order differential attacks.
A differential in which only some of the bits are known is called a truncated differential. The
idea is that because fewer bits are being estimated, the propagation should be easier. However,
the propagation of truncated differentials relies largely on strong alignment of the system. For a
complete treatment of this, we refer to the KECCAK team’s excellent coverage of the subject in [47].
We note only that a particular conclusion is that bit-oriented transformations have weak alignment,
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thus truncated differentials become extremely difficult to propagate. Because of the effect of our
bitwise permutation and the very small differential probabilities of our S-box, we believe that any
attack based on truncated differentials would not exceed a few rounds of our underlying permutation
at worst.
A higher-order differential is a differential that consists of several differences. It could be
thought of as a difference of differences. One of the conclusions of [46] is that a higher-order
differential attack will only be effective against a system of sufficiently low algebraic degree. This
is why, for example, such attacks have yet to be effective against AES. Because of this, as we
will elaborate on in the next section, we believe that our system will be resistant to higher-order
differential attacks.
5.4 Algebraic Attacks
Differential and linear cryptanalysis take a probabilistic approach to estimating the behavior of a
system. In contrast, algebraic attacks take a deterministic approach in that they aim to find mathe-
matical models of a system that hold with unity probability. For example, in 2001 Ferguson et al.
[48] introduced an elegant and complete algebraic representation of AES. The ability to create such
a simple mathematical representation of the cipher initially raised alarm throughout the crypto-
graphic community. However, the security of AES seems to not be compromised since we believe it
is far too difficult to solve such an algebraic system. We discuss a few potentially relevant algebraic
attacks here that follow a similar idea.
5.4.1 XL and XSL Attacks
There has been some ongoing work related to reducing the cryptanalysis of cryptosystems to the
solution of multivariate quadratic (MQ) equations. The first attempted attack to leverage this work,
called the eXtended Linearization (XL) attack, was introduced by Courtois et al. in 2000 [49]. This
attack works by transforming a system of MQ equations into a much larger overdefined system of
linear equations. The idea is that while we are bad at solving nonlinear systems, linear systems are
quite easy for us to solve. However, XL is still an impractical attack because after linearization the
system of equations is simply too large to solve.
In 2002, Courtois et al. [50] introduced the eXtended Sparse Linearization (XSL) attack as an
attempt to improve on XL. This attack leverages the fact that the complexity of XL drops signif-
icantly if the MQ system is sparse and regularly structured in addition to being overdefined. The
authors shows that for Serpent (an AES candidate) and AES itself, the MQ system does end up
satisfying these properties. Still, no practical attack has risen out of these efforts due to the fact that
the complexity of such an attack remains computationally infeasible.
Until there is reason to believe otherwise, it seems that these algebraic attacks would be highly
ineffective against our permutation. Even if there were a practical XSL attack demonstrated on
AES, which all literature indicates as highly implausible right now, the much larger size of our S-
box and therefore the much higher algebraic complexity (see [33]) leads us to conjecture that our
permutation would still be resistant.
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5.4.2 Cube Attacks
Cube attacks were fairly recently introduced by Dinur and Shamir in 2008 [51]. This cryptanalysis
method is intriguing because it can be applied to cryptosystems which are treated as a black box;
that is, the internal structure of the system does not need to be known. For an attack to work, at least
one output bit must be able to be represented by a polynomial of relatively low degree. Cube attacks
have had minor success. For example, Lathrop demonstrated a successful attack on four rounds of a
224-bit hash variant of KECCAK in his 2009 thesis on the subject [52]. He estimates that this attack
could be practical up to seven rounds.
Given that KECCAK is also based on the sponge construction, it may be fair to question whether
cube attacks are applicable to our algorithm. However, KECCAK is unique in the sense that its round
function has a very low degree of only two. Systems like AES which use sufficiently large S-boxes,
as ours does, do not generally have the property that output bits can be represented as polynomials
of small degree. In fact, the degrees of any such polynomials are typically extremely high [53].
Therefore we conclude that our algorithm is immune to cube attacks.
5.5 Other Cryptanalysis
There are several other attacks that are very dissimilar from both differential and linear attacks as
well as algebraic attacks. We present the two that we believe to be the most prevalent and relevant
in this section.
5.5.1 Slide Attacks
Slide attacks were introduced in 1999 by Biryukov and Wagner [54]. A slide attack has the inter-
esting property that it is independent of the number of rounds of the system. Therefore the common
method of having a high number of simple rounds to provide security is no longer valid if proper
care is not taken. These attacks work by exploiting the self-similarity of a system with respect to
the behavior of its rounds. For example, a block cipher with a periodic key schedule is at risk be-
cause the groups of rounds belonging to a period of the key schedule can be abstractly considered
as “larger rounds” within the slide attack methodology. This similarity is then exploited.
One of the key advantages that we repeatedly mention in this thesis is that the sponge and duplex
constructions do not require a key schedule since keys are treated the same as any other input data.
Therefore, we do not even have to consider any weaknesses that may be presented by poor subkey
generation. For unkeyed permutation design, one of the simplest methods to prevent against slide
attacks is to XOR round constants into the state every round. This disrupts self-similarity across
rounds as long as the round constants never repeat, which ours do not. In addition, our round
constants are completely independent of each other and no relation can be drawn between them
except for the fact that they are all generated by the SHA-3 hashing function. These properties
easily lead to the conclusion that our permutation f is not susceptible to slide attacks.
5.5.2 Integral Attacks
Integral cryptanalysis was initially presented in 1997 by Daemen et al. [55] as a dedicated attack on
the block cipher Square (interestingly, in the same paper as the initial specification of Square). As
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such, it is sometimes called the Square attack. However, it has since been extended to attacks on
other systems.
Integral cryptanalysis analyzes the propagation of special sets (or multisets) of chosen plaintexts.
In the basic version, all of the bitstrings belonging to a set are related by the property that most of
the bits are held constant while a contiguous block is varied through all 2n possibilities, where n is
the length of the block. For example, if n = 8 (a byte), then a set will contain 28 = 256 unique
bitstrings that iterate through all possibilities of values for that byte. These bitstrings necessarily
have the property that the bitwise XOR sum of the varied bytes will be equal to zero. It is the
behavior of this sum that is analyzed as it propagates throughout the system, and any significant
non-random behavior can lead to an attack.
While the classical form of this attack has even been extended to AES with some success [56],
we argue that our bitwise permutation step eliminates any chance of success against our underlying
f function. This technique will clearly break down for systems that are not entirely block-based,
so our hybrid design approach of using both bit-oriented and word-oriented operations excels here.
Indeed, this is the same argument the KECCAK team initially makes in [22].
Z’aba et. al generalized integral attacks in 2008 to bit-oriented systems with some success [57].
While arguably not as powerful as the basic block-oriented form of the attack, it has, for example,
broken up to five rounds of PRESENT with only 80 chosen plaintexts compared to the 220 required
for a differential attack. However, they note at the conclusion of their paper that bit-oriented integral
attacks simply do not extend, even with low probability, past the first few rounds of such systems.
This is in great contrast to differential and linear cryptanalysis, which always extend but with greatly
reduced probability. The exact resistance of our algorithm to this new bit-oriented integral attack
would have to be studied more in depth, but given the aforementioned results, we believe that it is
highly unlikely that an integral attack would extend past the initial rounds of our permutation.
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Chapter 6
Statistical Testing
In addition to the previously described cryptanalysis techniques, it can be insightful to analyze
the output of a cryptosystem purely on a statistical basis. Two methods of statistical testing were
explored here: using the NIST Statistical Tool Suite for randomness testing, and creating our own
tool to check that we meet the avalanche criterion. Both of these methods help provide evidence
that the system behaves randomly. However, they are certainly not a replacement for the previously
described cryptanalysis techniques.
6.1 NIST STS Testing
6.1.1 Overview
NIST created and maintains the Statistical Tool Suite (STS) for randomness testing of binary data
[58]. While its primary purpose is for testing random and pseudorandom number generators, it
can be applied to general symmetric key cryptosystem testing if proper measures are taken. For
example, Soto (in affiliation with NIST) used an earlier version of the STS in 1999 to analyze the
AES candidates [59].
The STS requires very long bitstrings as input in order to ensure valid results. The NIST recom-
mendation is at least 55 bitstrings each of length 220 bits (1 Mb) for most tests in the suite. Because
block ciphers such as the AES candidates have small, fixed length outputs, Soto had to concatenate
many “derived” output blocks together to form one input bitstring for the STS. The derived blocks
come from using the block cipher, for example, in various modes of operation such as CBC. The
validity of this method is debatable since the STS ends up testing the mode of operation of the
block cipher rather than the block cipher itself. A better statistical test for block ciphers and other
symmetric key cryptosystems with fixed length outputs would be the coincidence test based on a
Bayesian approach as described by Kaminsky in [60].
For this reason, we chose a different method to generate STS inputs. Because the STS is in-
tended for random and pseudorandom number generators, we used the sponge construction in the
keystream generation mode detailed in Section 3.1.2. We absorb a 128-bit key (with no IV, for
simplicity) and squeeze out 1 Mb of keystream material. This is very similar to a pseudorandom
number generator because a good keystream generator will behave as a cryptographically secure
pseudorandom bitstream generator. While this does not directly test the duplex construction, we
remind the reader that the duplex construction can be reduced to the sponge construction as shown
in Section 3.2.3. Therefore we believe that this is the best method to use the NIST STS for statistical
testing of our cryptosystem.
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There is one input file generated for every number of rounds up to the maximum of 16. Each
input file consists of 128 bitstrings, each of which is acquired by toggling a unique bit of the key
and squeezing as previously described.
6.1.2 STS Test Descriptions
The NIST STS runs a battery of 15 different tests on an input file in an attempt to discover any
non-random behavior. We very briefly describe those tests here. Interested readers may refer to [58]
for a much more in-depth description of each test.
1. Frequency: Determines whether the number of ones and zeros in a bitstring is approximately
the same as it would be for a truly random bitstring. All subsequent tests rely on the passing
of this test.
2. Block Frequency: Determines whether the number of ones and zeros in M -bit blocks of a
bitstring is approximately the same as it would be for a truly random bitstring. We use the
default recommended value for our input size: M = 128.
3. Runs: Determines whether the number of runs of ones and zeros of various length is ap-
proximately the same as it would be for a truly random bitstring. A run is an uninterrupted
sequence of identical bits.
4. Longest Run of Ones in a Block: Determines whether the longest run of ones in M -bit
blocks of a bitstring is approximately the same as it would be for a truly random bitstring.
(A deviation from random for longest run of ones also indicates a deviation for longest run
of zeros, thus only one test is needed.) The preset value for M is 104 for bitstrings of length
greater than 750, 000; this is what we use.
5. Binary Matrix Rank: Determines whether the linear independence (i.e. rank) of disjoint
M × Q matrices built from an input bitstring is approximately the same as it would be for a
truly random bitstring. The preset values M = Q = 32 are used.
6. Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral): Determines whether the spectral frequency of a
bitstring is approximately the same as it would be for a truly random bitstring.
7. Non-Overlapping Template Matching: Determines whether the number of occurrences of
an m-bit aperiodic pattern within a bitstring is approximately the same as it would be for a
truly random bitstring. Patterns are not allowed to overlap. We use the default recommended
value for our input size: m = 9. This test is actually comprised of 148 separate tests for
different preset patterns.
8. Overlapping Template Matching: Determines whether the number of occurrences of an
m-bit all-one pattern within a bitstring is approximately the same as it would be for a truly
random bitstring. The pattern may overlap. We use the default recommended value for our
input size: m = 9.
9. Maurer’s “Universal Statistical” Test: Determines whether the achievable level of com-
pression of a bitstring is approximately the same as it would be for a truly random bitstring.
A bitstring that can be compressed significantly is considered to exhibit non-random behavior.
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10. Linear Complexity: Determines whether the length of a Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR) that adequately models M -bit blocks in a bitstring is approximately the same as it
would be for a truly random bitstring. A block that can be adequately modeled by a small
LFSR is considered to exhibit non-random behavior. We use the default recommended value
for our input size: M = 500.
11. Serial: Determines whether the frequency of all possible overlapping m-bit patterns is ap-
poximately the same as it would be for a truly random bitstring. Note that for m = 1, this
is equivalent to the previously described Frequency test. We use the default recommended
value for our input size: m = 16.
12. Approximate Entropy: Determines whether the frequency of all possiblem- and (m+1)-bit
patterns is approximately the same as it would be for a truly random bitstring. We use the
default recommended value for our input size: m = 10.
13. Cumulative Sums (Cusums): Determines whether the (forward and reverse) cumulative
sums of a bitstring are approximately the same as they would be for a truly random bitstring.
A cumulative sum that is too large or small indicates too many ones or zeros in the early (for
forward) or late (for reverse) stages of the bitstring.
14. Random Excursions: Determines whether the distribution of the number of visits of a one-
dimensional random walk to a certain state is approximately the same as it would be for a
truly random bitstring. This test is actually comprised of eight separate tests, one for each of
the states in [−4,−1] ∪ [+1,+4].
15. Random Excursions Variant: Determines whether the distribution of the number of visits
across many one-dimensional random walks to a certain state is approximately the same as it
would be for a truly random bitstring. This test is actually comprised of 18 separate tests, one
for each of the states in [−9,−1] ∪ [+1,+9].
To interpret the results of each test, one needs to understand some very basic probability theory.
The null hypothesis is the hypothesis that there exists no statistical significance in a given set of
observations. We accept or reject the null hypothesis based on the results of each test on each
bitstring. For our purposes, accepting the null hypothesis means that the bitstream in question
exhibits no significant non-random behavior; this is what we desire. Each STS test outputs a P-
value (between 0 and 1) that summarizes the strength of the evidence against the null hypothesis.
It indicates the probability that a perfectly random bitstring would have produced a sequence less
random than the one under test. For example, if a test returns a P-value of 1, then the bitstring under
test exhibits perfect randomness.
In order to translate this to a pass/fail test, we must choose a significance level, denoted α, such
that if P-value ≥ α then the null hypothesis is accepted. We use the default NIST-recommended
value of α = .01 here. This means that an acceptance of the null hypothesis has a 99% confidence
level. In other words, we expect that one out of every 100 truly random bitstrings is falsely rejected.
6.1.3 Results
NIST recommends two approaches for interpreting the results of a statistical test for all bitstrings
in an input file. The first is based on the proportion of P-values which pass (i.e. for which the null
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hypothesis is accepted for that bitstring). The STS directly provides support for this. The second
is based on the distribution of P-values. The STS provides some support for this, but further work
is needed to come up with an overall pass/fail result for each test. For this, we wrote the script
provided in Section E.3.
P-value Proportions
The first method of interpreting test results for an entire input file is based on the proportion of
bitstrings that generate P-values which pass the test. Acceptable proportions are given by the con-
fidence interval
pˆ± 3
√
pˆ(1− pˆ)
m
,
where pˆ = 1 − α = 0.99 and m = 128 is the sample size. In our case, the lower bound on the
confidence interval is approximately 0.9636. If a proportion is below this, the test on that input file
fails. The Random Excursions Variant test does not always use all m = 128 inputs it is given and
thus the lower bound may be decreased in some cases. The details behind this are considered out
of scope of this thesis. However, we do note that the minimum lower bound for this particular test
occurs at approximately 0.9576 when m = 66 is used.
We present in Table 6.1 the pass/fail results for every number of rounds up to the maximum of
16 as provided directly by the NIST STS output. If a test failed, we indicate which test it was and
the corresponding P-value. For tests which consist of numerous subtests, we list exactly which test
failed. For example, a failed Non-Overlapping Template test includes the template number. A failed
Random Excursion (Variant) test includes the state it failed on.
At first, it may seem alarming that statistical tests are failing at all. However, one must take
into account that the proportion for a failed test at most exceeds the lower bound less than .03.
Furthermore, there are no significantly repeated failures; that is, no specific test fails a high number
of times and therefore raises a concern. While the Non-Overlapping Template test does fail more
often than others, it represents the vast majority of the overall tests run and so this is expected. In
addition, it does not repeatedly fail on a specific template.
We contrast these results with those found for the AES candidate HPC in [59]. This was the only
AES candidate found to exhibit definitively non-random statistical behavior. HPC failed 23.96% of
the time in multiple tests, which is far greater than our failure rate. In the same year it was discovered
that HPC suffers from equivalent keys [61]. Our results are similar to the rest of the AES candidate
algorithms, for which there are no real statistical anomalies.
P-value Distribution
It is also important to verify that the distribution of P-values for each test is uniform enough. Even
if a test passed in the previous section, a uniformity failure on the P-values indicates non-random
behavior. The uniformity test NIST recommends involves computing a χ2 statistic with nine degrees
of freedom on the “binned” P-values for each test. NIST provides minimal support for this by
binning the P-values into 10 equally spaced intervals for each test. The χ2 statistic is given by
χ2 =
10∑
i=1
(Fi − s10)2
s
10
,
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# Rounds # Tests Passed # Tests Failed Failed Tests & Proportions
1 188 1 Spectral (0.9609)
2 188 1 Random Excursions Variant [+3] (0.9529)
3 187 2
Non-Overlapping Template [#58] (0.9531)
Random Excursions Variant [+2] (0.9529)
4 187 2
Non-Overlapping Template [#54] (0.9609)
Overlapping Template (0.9609)
5 187 2
Non-Overlapping Template [#32] (0.9609)
Non-Overlapping Template [#86] (0.9609)
6 187 2
Non-Overlapping Template [#4] (0.9531)
Non-Overlapping Template [#100] (0.9609)
7 186 3
Non-Overlapping Template [#22] (0.9609)
Non-Overlapping Template [#68] (0.9609)
Random Excursions [+4] (0.9420)
8 187 2
Non-Overlapping Template [#126] (0.9453)
Non-Overlapping Template [#137] (0.9609)
9 187 2
Non-Overlapping Template [#12] (0.9609)
Random Excursions [-1] (0.9467)
10 188 1 Non-Overlapping Template [#103] (0.9609)
11 187 2
Non-Overlapping Template [#45] (0.9453)
Non-Overlapping Template [#109] (0.9609)
12 186 3
Spectral (0.9609)
Non-Overlapping Template [#104] (0.9609)
Non-Overlapping Template [#110] (0.9609)
13 189 0 N/A
14 188 1 Non-Overlapping Template [#79] (0.9531)
15 189 0 N/A
16 186 3
Non-Overlapping Template [#81] (0.9609)
Non-Overlapping Template [#102] (0.9609)
Non-Overlapping Template [#130] (0.9531)
Table 6.1: NIST Statistical Test Suite results
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where Fi is the number of P-values in bin i and s is the sample size. A new valued called P-valueT
is then calculated as follows:
P-valueT = igamc(
9
2
,
χ2
2
)
where igamc is the incomplete gamma function given by
Q(a, x) =
1
Γ(a)
∞∫
x
e−tta−1dt
and the gamma function Γ is
Γ(z) =
∞∫
0
tz−1e−tdt.
The resulting P-valueT is compared to a new significance level α = .0001 as recommended by
NIST. If P-valueT ≥ α then the uniformity test passes.
Our Python script uses the SciPy library [62] to help compute P-valueT for every test and for
every number of rounds. There were zero uniformity failures for each number of rounds tested up
to the maximum of 16.
6.2 Avalanche Testing
The avalanche criterion (AC) is stated as follows: when a single bit of the input changes, on average
half of the output bits should change. For our construction, it makes most sense to test for the AC at
the permutation level. In particular, we are interested in how many rounds it takes for the AC to be
satisfied. At this number of rounds, the permutation f is said to achieve full diffusion. Intuitively,
it is good practice to maximize the number of full diffusions achieved within the number of rounds
used for the algorithm.
As part of our permutation test code given in Section E.1.5, we provide a function for computing
the average Hamming distance (i.e. number of bits changed) between the input and output for every
number of rounds up to the maximum of 16. This is done by, for each number of rounds, consec-
utively toggling one bit at a time of the initial state and running the permutation, keeping track of
Hamming distances between the inputs and outputs along the way. The minimum and maximum
Hamming distances are also computed for completeness. The results of this experiment are shown
in Table 6.2.
From this table, it is clear that full diffusion is achieved over the entire 512-bit state after just
three rounds of the underlying permutation. This means that for a 128-bit key with 10 rounds, three
full diffusions are achieved. For a 256-bit key with 16 rounds, five full diffusions are achieved.
As with the NIST STS results, this does not at all imply resistance against powerful attacks such
as linear and differential cryptanalysis. In fact, linear and differential cryptanalysis have been shown
to be very effective against cryptographic primitives which satisfy the AC [63]. We present these
results merely as further proof of the excellent diffusive capabilities of our bitwise permutation and
mixing steps.
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# Rounds Average HD Min HD Max HD
1 21.94 10 36
2 180.29 113 242
3 256.28 223 283
4 256.10 226 287
5 256.40 220 289
6 256.55 227 293
7 255.50 211 287
8 255.65 220 289
9 256.20 219 289
10 256.05 219 295
11 256.87 218 287
12 255.39 224 291
13 255.18 218 289
14 256.82 224 288
15 256.04 223 290
16 255.41 221 286
Table 6.2: Avalanche test results for the permutation f
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis we designed an authenticated encryption algorithm based on the duplex construc-
tion that we believe to be highly secure. This algorithm can be customized on a per-user or per-
application basis by following the guidelines we presented as part of its specification. We believe
that this is the only customizable authenticated encryption algorithm to date. Furthermore, we
believe that this is the first cryptosystem to use a 16-bit S-box. We have shown that this large S-
box, when combined with good diffusion, provides superior resistance against differential and linear
cryptanalysis due to its small differential probabilities and linear biases. Because this S-box is based
on bijective power mappings over a Galois field, it can be efficiently implemented in hardware (like
the rest of our algorithm) and does not require a look-up table.
Following the algorithm specification, we presented a survey of state of the art cryptanalysis
techniques and assessed our algorithm’s resistance against them. Additionally, we provided a com-
prehensive statistical evaluation of the cryptosystem through the use of existing tools as well as our
own. Our algorithm demonstrates no significant non-random statistical behavior and its underlying
permutation achieves full diffusion on the entire 512-bit state after only three rounds.
7.2 Future Work
The scope of this thesis is quite wide. As a result, there are many items that we would love to
research further but have so far been unable to. Several of these items are provided here.
1. Cryptanalysis: The duplex construction we use guarantees security against generic attacks,
and our underlying permutation is designed for resistance against many powerful cryptanaly-
sis techniques. However, as with all cryptosystems, further cryptanalysis is always welcome
and encouraged. In particular, it is likely possible to prove better bounds for our resistance
against differential and linear cryptanalysis. So far, we have proved only the absolute worst
case. Furthermore, it could be interesting to dig deeper into the fairly new bit-oriented inte-
gral attacks. While we strongly believe our permutation to be secure against such an attack,
it would be a worthwhile exercise to attempt to prove this resistance.
2. Hardware Design: Due to time constraints we have only provided a software model of the
algorithm in this thesis. In practice, our algorithm is intended for hardware (e.g. FPGA)
implementation. One of the natural next steps is to implement the construction in hardware
and benchmark its performance.
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3. S-boxes: The particular instantiation of our algorithm described in Chapter 4 uses a specific
S-box based on bijective power mappings. We analyzed this S-box to determine its maximum
differential probability and maximum linear bias. There are several other similar S-boxes
provided in [33]. It would be helpful to also analyze these other S-boxes in order to determine
if their statistical properties are much different. If the maximum probabilities and biases are
very close to those of our particular S-box, these other S-boxes could be swapped in as a
customization without the need for determining new security margins (and possibly adjusting
the number of rounds). In addition, it would be extremely fruitful to find completely new
cryptographically secure 16-bit S-boxes that are efficiently implementable in hardware.
4. Large Mixers: Part of the reason that we use a 2 × 2 matrix multiplication for our mixer is
that it is extremely efficient to implement in hardware. It is well known that the maximum
branch number of an m × m matrix is m + 1. We achieve the maximum differential and
linear branch number of three with this mixer. Larger matrices are capable of achieving
higher branch numbers, and so it would be interesting to further explore them. In particular,
Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) matrices such as the one used in AES are capable of
achieving the maximum branch number. However, the construction of large MDS matrices
that are efficiently implementable is a difficult problem [38]. An in-depth analysis of the
tradeoff between a large MDS matrix with fewer rounds and a small matrix with more rounds
is welcome for future work.
5. ARX-Based Mixers: As part of the work that did not make it into the final AE algorithm
presented here, we analyzed many ARX-based mixers. None of these mixers were able to
achieve a branch number greater than two (the worst possible). So far it is unclear what
an ARX-based mixer with branch number equal to three would look like, if it even exists.
While we believe that our matrix multiplication-based mixer is an excellent choice, it would
still be interesting to further analyze ARX-based mixers in an attempt to generalize their
characteristics with respect to differential and linear cryptanalysis.
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Appendix A
PRESENT Trail Illustration
Figure A.1: Example of an attack on PRESENT that arose due to poor selection of a bitwise
permutation. The combination of fixed-points and a low-order permutation results in a trail which
minimizes the number of active S-boxes across four rounds [35].
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Appendix B
Bitwise Permutation Listing
The following bitwise permutations defined by the affine function
pi(x) = αx+ β
satisfy all required properties listed in Chapter 4. The order of all bitwise permutations listed here
is 32.
α 31 33 95 97 159 161 223 225 287 289 351 353 415 417 479 481
C
or
re
sp
on
di
ng
β
va
lu
es
15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16
31 48 31 48 31 48 31 48 31 48 31 48 31 48 31 48
47 80 47 80 47 80 47 80 47 80 47 80 47 80 47 80
63 112 63 112 63 112 63 112 63 112 63 112 63 112 63 112
79 144 79 144 79 144 79 144 79 144 79 144 79 144 79 144
95 176 95 176 95 176 95 176 95 176 95 176 95 176 95 176
111 208 111 208 111 208 111 208 111 208 111 208 111 208 111 208
127 240 127 240 127 240 127 240 127 240 127 240 127 240 127 240
143 272 143 272 143 272 143 272 143 272 143 272 143 272 143 272
159 304 159 304 159 304 159 304 159 304 159 304 159 304 159 304
175 336 175 336 175 336 175 336 175 336 175 336 175 336 175 336
191 368 191 368 191 368 191 368 191 368 191 368 191 368 191 368
207 400 207 400 207 400 207 400 207 400 207 400 207 400 207 400
223 432 223 432 223 432 223 432 223 432 223 432 223 432 223 432
239 464 239 464 239 464 239 464 239 464 239 464 239 464 239 464
255 496 255 496 255 496 255 496 255 496 255 496 255 496 255 496
271 271 271 271 271 271 271 271
287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287
303 303 303 303 303 303 303 303
319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319
335 335 335 335 335 335 335 335
351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351
367 367 367 367 367 367 367 367
383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383
399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399
415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415
431 431 431 431 431 431 431 431
447 447 447 447 447 447 447 447
463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463
479 479 479 479 479 479 479 479
495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495
511 511 511 511 511 511 511 511
Table B.1: Bitwise permutations satisfying all desired properties
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Appendix C
ARX-Based Mixers
As part of the design process for the cryptosystem described in this thesis, many ARX-based mixers
were analyzed before deciding to switch to a mixer based on matrix multiplication in a Galois field.
None of these ARX-based mixers were able to increase the linear and differential branch numbers
from two to three, which is one of our requirements. For completeness, we enumerate all of the
mixers we analyzed here.
One of the mixers is based on the ARX structure used in Threefish, the block cipher used within
SHA-3 candidate Skein [64]. Another is based on the recently released lightweight block cipher
Speck that was created by the National Security Agency [65]. From these ideas, more complex
ARX structures were constructed and analyzed.
In all diagrams shown here, the ROT operation represents all possible nontrivial left and right
rotations on a single word. Mixers corresponding to every single combination of rotations were
analyzed. The  symbol denotes addition modulo 216. It is a nonlinear operation due to effect of
the carry bit. The ⊕ symbol denotes XOR, as usual.
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A B
ROT
A′ B′
Figure C.1: Candidate mixer inspired by Threefish
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A B
ROT
ROT
A′ B′
Figure C.2: Candidate mixer inspired by Speck
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A B
ROT
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Figure C.3: Custom candidate mixers
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Appendix D
Known Answer Tests
Key (128) 00000000000000000000000000000000
IV 00000000000000000000000000000000
A (header) 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
B (body) 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Ciphertext 55851b98d902192aa6e0f23738205b74802c7702b5b88bd44de711f4188d5a43a5fcfdd178e6e8e05a28761723974fe978c1c83d378a40490bf5e944f862b452
Tag (MAC) 2a0ae2db865ec69dc7a075d089986466
Key (128) 00000000000000000000000000000000
IV 00000000000000000000000000000000
A (header) 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
B (body)
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Ciphertext
a5fcfdd178e6e8e05a28761723974fe978c1c83d378a40490bf5e944f862b452
9f671ea19fbc2611d372b98ba6eda6f46ef6b6123ec2c1512e7c9e0cfd878a87
46726b4fe11801f76457be25f0ba2b662a0ae2db865ec69dc7a075d089986466
f360b07d5d532261868d610ffa26cc4d8cbdc43cf9f777ce7cb3861b2ff35022
Tag (MAC) b42652acb41d263633b554bb15bad007
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Key (128) 00000000000000000000000000000000
IV 00000000000000000000000000000000
A (header) (empty)
B (body) 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Ciphertext daa223c25a6dacc0934c82a7c0bf45e730d4bc43cb07e36703a34e24655c4c65
Tag (MAC) 802c7702b5b88bd44de711f4188d5a43
Key (128) 00000000000000000000000000000001
IV 00000000000000000000000000000000
A (header) (empty)
B (body) 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Ciphertext e77f18fee964bc2c4a3419a3cf97c558b38d5649af7877a31793cb7850ec8d61
Tag (MAC) 51c466c4d46e4a94d627452d1802a257
Key (128) a110c8b01dc0ffeedea110c8a11decaf
IV 12345678901234567890123456789012
A (header) (empty)
B (body) b0a710ad50fc0c0a5ca1ab1eca55e77e
Ciphertext f80da4aa7a9a54541902747e4eef2977
Tag (MAC) 8f81ba4c838d9f5ee93bbef40752a0f8
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Key (256) 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
IV 00000000000000000000000000000000
A (header) 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
B (body) 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Ciphertext 53fe8b7d1cfefc5f12fe27b42efe8669d1f15b0ecfb0b8adcc0aeeee50f170d7ce5a0e25d9b03dc55057e093fbaad8e5b83cb0fbc3249e3e38ec9bc7966b177e
Tag (MAC) 1770e24ce3ddeaed27a817c41d6af97b
Key (256) 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
IV 00000000000000000000000000000000
A (header) 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
B (body)
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Ciphertext
ce5a0e25d9b03dc55057e093fbaad8e5b83cb0fbc3249e3e38ec9bc7966b177e
0fc577cf886970f3638628130c7e0b0264ca2017d5f150cd9a2c0866008319ce
f9feb4a28983be315cfb538fcb79f30c1770e24ce3ddeaed27a817c41d6af97b
531d26ae76128bfc19fa632472f010d57c14a906fef7801110125a0e1ef3fd9a
Tag (MAC) d29be6e3b6013168e83421743a82fed2
Key (256) 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
IV 00000000000000000000000000000000
A (header) (empty)
B (body) 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Ciphertext ed2376dfe1268a96f10cad1f97f7a9d38838ff1abc53459a1f395170f552f3ec
Tag (MAC) d1f15b0ecfb0b8adcc0aeeee50f170d7
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Key (256) 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001
IV 00000000000000000000000000000000
A (header) (empty)
B (body) 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Ciphertext b1fc1266e17b4aac3bf582ce759c1f21c16e30d893e455f0246eaf948a83d9d3
Tag (MAC) 558b474275fc8910a6b713eed680c5d6
Key (256) a110c8b01dc0ffeedea110c8a11decafa110c8b01dc0ffeedea110c8a11decaf
IV 12345678901234567890123456789012
A (header) (empty)
B (body) b0a710ad50fc0c0a5ca1ab1eca55e77e
Ciphertext d1c39640e6e42373c54a727d4ed45cd6
Tag (MAC) 2e15194003f7ed304557991dc19e4e88
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Appendix E
Source Code Listings
E.1 AE Algorithm Software Implementation
E.1.1 State.h
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ A 512− b i t s t a t e s p l i t i n t o 32 16− b i t words .
∗ P r o v i d e s word and b i t a c c e s s .
∗ I n c l u d e s a l l n e c e s s a r y f u n c t i o n s f o r absorb ing , s q u e e z i n g , copy ing , e t c .
∗
∗ Author : Matt K e l l y
∗ Date : June 2014
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
# i f n d e f STATE H
# d e f i n e STATE H
# i n c l u d e <s t d i n t . h>
# i n c l u d e <s t d i o . h>
# i n c l u d e <s t d e x c e p t> / / s t d : : o u t o f r a n g e
# i n c l u d e <s t r i n g . h> / / memcpy
# d e f i n e WIDTH 512
# d e f i n e WORD SIZE 16
# d e f i n e NUM WORDS WIDTH / WORD SIZE
c l a s s S t a t e {
p r i v a t e :
u i n t 1 6 t s t a t e [NUM WORDS] ;
p u b l i c :
/∗∗
∗ C o n s t r u c t o r − c r e a t e new a l l−z e r o s t a t e
∗ /
S t a t e ( )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < NUM WORDS; ++ i )
s t a t e [ i ] = 0 ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Copy c o n s t r u c t o r
∗ /
S t a t e ( c o n s t S t a t e &o t h e r )
{
memcpy ( s t a t e , o t h e r . s t a t e , s i z e o f ( s t a t e ) ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Copy c o n t e n t s o f t h i s s t a t e i n t o g i v e n o u t p u t array ,
∗ s t a r t i n g from g i v e n o f f s e t .
∗ /
void copy ( u i n t 1 6 t o u t p u t [ ] , i n t numWords , i n t o f f s e t )
{
62
memcpy(& o u t p u t [ o f f s e t ] , s t a t e , s i z e o f ( u i n t 1 6 t ) ∗ numWords ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Re tu rn r e f e r e n c e t o word a t g i v e n i n d e x i n s t a t e
∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t& operator [ ] ( c o n s t unsigned i n t x )
{
i f ( x > NUM WORDS− 1 )
throw s t d : : o u t o f r a n g e ( ” I n v a l i d i n d e x ” ) ;
re turn s t a t e [ x ] ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Re tu rn r e f e r e n c e t o word a t g i v e n i n d e x i n s t a t e
∗ /
c o n s t u i n t 1 6 t& operator [ ] ( c o n s t unsigned i n t x ) c o n s t
{
i f ( x > NUM WORDS− 1 )
throw s t d : : o u t o f r a n g e ( ” I n v a l i d i n d e x ” ) ;
re turn s t a t e [ x ] ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Re tu rn t r u e i f t h i s s t a t e i s e q u a l t o o t h e r s t a t e
∗ /
c o n s t bool operator ==( c o n s t S t a t e& o t h e r )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < NUM WORDS; ++ i )
i f ( s t a t e [ i ] != o t h e r [ i ] ) re turn f a l s e ;
re turn true ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Re tu rn t r u e i f t h i s s t a t e i s d i f f e r e n t from o t h e r s t a t e
∗ /
c o n s t bool operator ! = ( c o n s t S t a t e& o t h e r ) { re turn ! operator ==( o t h e r ) ; }
/∗∗
∗ Get b i t a t g i v e n i n d e x
∗ /
i n t g e t B i t ( unsigned i n t x ) c o n s t
{
re turn ( s t a t e [ x / 16] >> ( x % 1 6 ) ) & 1 ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Clear b i t a t g i v e n i n d e x
∗ /
void c l e a r B i t ( unsigned i n t x )
{
s t a t e [ x / 16] &= ˜ ( 1 << ( x % 1 6 ) ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ S e t b i t a t g i v e n i n d e x
∗ /
void s e t B i t ( unsigned i n t x )
{
s t a t e [ x / 16] |= (1 << ( x % 1 6 ) ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ I n v e r t b i t a t g i v e n i n d e x
∗ /
void i n v e r t B i t ( unsigned i n t x )
{
s t a t e [ x / 16] ˆ= (1 << ( x % 1 6 ) ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ S e t o u t e r r = 128 b i t s o f s t a t e t o g i v e n v a l u e
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∗ /
void s e t O u t e r S t a t e ( u i n t 1 6 t v a l u e [ 8 ] )
{
memcpy ( s t a t e , va lue , s i z e o f ( u i n t 1 6 t ) ∗ 8 ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ XOR o u t e r r = 128 b i t s o f s t a t e w i t h g i v e n v a l u e
∗ Assumpt ion : v a l u e i s c o r r e c t l e n g t h
∗ /
void x o r O u t e r S t a t e ( u i n t 1 6 t v a l u e [ 8 ] )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 8 ; ++ i )
s t a t e [ i ] ˆ= v a l u e [ i ] ;
}
/∗∗
∗ S e t i n n e r c = 384 b i t s o f s t a t e t o g i v e n v a l u e
∗ /
void s e t I n n e r S t a t e ( u i n t 1 6 t v a l u e [ 2 4 ] )
{
memcpy(& s t a t e [ 8 ] , va lue , s i z e o f ( u i n t 1 6 t ) ∗ 8 ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Clear a l l b i t s ( s e t s t a t e t o 0 x000 . . . 0 )
∗ /
void c l e a r A l l ( )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < NUM WORDS; ++ i )
s t a t e [ i ] = 0 x0000 ;
}
/∗∗
∗ S e t a l l b i t s ( s e t s t a t e t o 0xFFF . . . F )
∗ /
void s e t A l l ( )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < NUM WORDS; ++ i )
s t a t e [ i ] = 0xFFFF ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Get t h e hamming w e i g h t o f t h i s s t a t e
∗ /
i n t getHW ( )
{
i n t hw = 0 ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < NUM WORDS; ++ i ) {
u i n t 1 6 t x = s t a t e [ i ] ;
whi le ( x ) {
i f ( x & 1 ) hw++;
x >>= 1 ;
}
}
re turn hw ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Get t h e hamming d i s t a n c e from t h i s s t a t e t o a n o t h e r s t a t e
∗ /
i n t getHammingDis tance ( S t a t e o t h e r )
{
i n t hd = 0 ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < WIDTH; ++ i )
i f ( g e t B i t ( i ) != o t h e r . g e t B i t ( i ) ) hd ++;
re turn hd ;
}
/∗∗
∗ P r i n t s t a t e i n words w i t h n i c e f o r m a t t i n g
∗ /
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void p r i n t ( FILE ∗o u t = s t d o u t )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < NUM WORDS; ++ i ) {
i f ( i > 0 && i % 8 == 0 ) f p r i n t f ( out , ”\n ” ) ;
f p r i n t f ( out , ”%04hx ” , s t a t e [ i ] ) ;
}
f p r i n t f ( out , ”\n\n ” ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ P r i n t s t a t e i n b i t s w i t h n i c e f o r m a t t i n g
∗ /
void p r i n t B i t s ( FILE ∗o u t = s t d o u t )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < WIDTH; ++ i ) {
i f ( i > 0 && i % 128 == 0 ) f p r i n t f ( out , ”\n ” ) ;
i f ( i > 0 && i % 16 == 0 && i % 128 != 0)
f p r i n t f ( out , ” ” ) ;
f p r i n t f ( out , ”%d ” , g e t B i t ( i ) ) ;
}
f p r i n t f ( out , ”\n\n ” ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ P r i n t s t a t e i n b i t s w i t h no f o r m a t t i n g
∗ /
void dumpBits ( FILE ∗o u t = s t d o u t )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < WIDTH; ++ i )
f p r i n t f ( out , ”%d ” , g e t B i t ( i ) ) ;
f p r i n t f ( out , ”\n ” ) ;
}
} ;
# e n d i f /∗ STATE H ∗ /
E.1.2 MixerGF.h
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ M a t h e m a t i c a l f u n c t i o n s f o r GF( 2 ˆ 1 6 )
∗ The i r r e d u c i b l e p o l y n o m i a l x ˆ16 + x ˆ5 + x ˆ3 + x ˆ2 + 1 i s used .
∗
∗ Author : Matt K e l l y
∗ Date : June 2014
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
# i f n d e f MIXER GF H
# d e f i n e MIXER GF H
# i n c l u d e <s t d i n t . h>
# i n c l u d e <s t d i o . h>
# i n c l u d e ” s t r i n g . h ”
/∗ F i e l d p o l y n o m i a l = x ˆ16 + x ˆ5 + x ˆ3 + x ˆ2 + 1 ∗ /
# d e f i n e FIELD POLY 0 x002d
/∗
∗ M u l t i p l y two p o l y n o m i a l s i n GF( 2 ˆ 1 6 ) , u s i n g t h e
∗ LSB f i r s t a l g o r i t h m
∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t g f m u l t i p l y ( u i n t 1 6 t a , u i n t 1 6 t b )
{
u i n t 1 6 t i ;
u i n t 1 6 t acc = 0 x0000 ; /∗ Accumula tor ∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t msb ; /∗ C u r r e n t MSB o f a ∗ /
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 1 6 ; ++ i ) {
/∗ I f LSB o f b i s 1 , add a t o a c c u m u l a t o r ∗ /
i f ( b & 0 x0001 ) acc ˆ= a ;
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/∗ S t o r e MSB o f a , t h e n s h i f t i t o f f ∗ /
msb = a & 0 x8000 ;
a <<= 1 ;
/∗ I f MSB o f a was 1 , add f i e l d p o l y n o m i a l t o a ∗ /
i f ( msb ) a ˆ= FIELD POLY ;
/∗ Advance t o n e x t b i t o f b ∗ /
b >>= 1 ;
}
re turn acc ;
}
/∗
∗ D i v i d e two p o l y n o m i a l s ( b / a ) i n GF( 2 ˆ 1 6 )
∗ /
void g f d i v i d e ( u i n t 1 6 t a , u i n t 1 6 t b , u i n t 1 6 t ∗q , u i n t 1 6 t ∗r , u i n t 1 6 t f i e l d p o l y )
{
u i n t 1 6 t i = 0 ;
u i n t 1 6 t j ;
u i n t 1 6 t q u o t i e n t = 0 x0000 ; /∗ Q u o t i e n t ∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t rem = b ; /∗ Remainder ∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t msb a ; /∗ C u r r e n t MSB o f a ∗ /
/∗ Perform i n i t i a l a l i g n m e n t ∗ /
msb a = a & 0 x8000 ;
whi le ( ! msb a && i < 16 ) {
a <<= 1 ;
msb a = a & 0 x8000 ;
i ++;
}
/∗ Take care o f f i e l d p o l y n o m i a l MSB ( b i t 8 ) ∗ /
i f ( f i e l d p o l y ) {
q u o t i e n t |= (1 << ( i + 1 ) ) ;
rem ˆ= ( a << 1 ) ;
}
/∗ Compute f o r r e m a i n i n g b i t s a f t e r a l i g n m e n t ∗ /
/∗ From t h i s p o i n t msb a i s a lways 1 ∗ /
f o r ( j = 0 ; j < i +1 ; ++ j ) {
i f ( ( rem << j ) & 0 x8000 ) {
/∗ Reduce i f needed ∗ /
q u o t i e n t |= (1 << ( i−j ) ) ;
rem ˆ= a ;
}
a >>= 1 ;
}
∗q = q u o t i e n t ;
∗ r = rem ;
}
/∗
∗ Find m u l t i p l i c a t i v e i n v e r s e o f a number i n GF( 2 ˆ 1 6 )
∗ u s i n g t h e Ex tended E u c l i d A l g o r i t h m .
∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t g f i n v e r s e ( u i n t 1 6 t a )
{
/∗ Map 0 x0000 t o 0 x0000 ∗ /
i f ( a == 0 x0000 ) {
re turn 0 x0000 ;
}
u i n t 1 6 t b = FIELD POLY ;
u i n t 1 6 t rem [ 1 6 ] ;
u i n t 1 6 t aux [ 1 6 ] ;
u i n t 1 6 t q , r ;
u i n t 1 6 t i ;
rem [ 0 ] = b ;
rem [ 1 ] = a ;
aux [ 0 ] = 0 ;
aux [ 1 ] = 1 ;
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i = 1 ;
whi le ( rem [ i ] > 0 x0001 ) {
i ++;
i f ( i == 2 )
g f d i v i d e ( rem [ i−1] , rem [ i−2] , &q , &r , 1 ) ;
e l s e
g f d i v i d e ( rem [ i−1] , rem [ i−2] , &q , &r , 0 ) ;
rem [ i ] = r ;
aux [ i ] = g f m u l t i p l y ( q , aux [ i−1]) ˆ aux [ i−2];
}
/∗ I n v e r s e o f A ( x ) i s i n c u r r e n t i n d e x o f aux ∗ /
re turn aux [ i ] ;
}
/∗
∗ C a l c u l a t e t h e i n v e r s e o f a 2 x2 m a t r i x
∗ I n p u t m a t r i x i s assumed t o be i n v e r t i b l e
∗ /
void g f 2 x 2 i n v e r s e ( u i n t 1 6 t M[ 2 ] [ 2 ] )
{
u i n t 1 6 t i ;
u i n t 1 6 t A[ 2 ] [ 4 ] = {{M[ 0 ] [ 0 ] , M[ 0 ] [ 1 ] , 1 , 0} ,
{M[ 1 ] [ 0 ] , M[ 1 ] [ 1 ] , 0 , 1}};
/ / S e t A [ 0 ] [ 0 ] t o 1
u i n t 1 6 t a 0 0 i n v = g f i n v e r s e (A [ 0 ] [ 0 ] ) ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 4 ; ++ i )
A[ 0 ] [ i ] = g f m u l t i p l y ( a00 inv , A[ 0 ] [ i ] ) ;
/ / S e t A [ 1 ] [ 0 ] t o 0
u i n t 1 6 t a10 = A [ 1 ] [ 0 ] ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 4 ; ++ i )
A[ 1 ] [ i ] = A[ 1 ] [ i ] ˆ g f m u l t i p l y ( a10 , A[ 0 ] [ i ] ) ;
/ / S e t A [ 1 ] [ 1 ] t o 1
u i n t 1 6 t a 1 1 i n v = g f i n v e r s e (A [ 1 ] [ 1 ] ) ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 4 ; ++ i )
A[ 1 ] [ i ] = g f m u l t i p l y ( a11 inv , A[ 1 ] [ i ] ) ;
/ / S e t A [ 0 ] [ 1 ] t o 0
u i n t 1 6 t a01 = A [ 0 ] [ 1 ] ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 4 ; ++ i )
A[ 0 ] [ i ] ˆ= g f m u l t i p l y ( a01 , A[ 1 ] [ i ] ) ;
/ / Re tu r n i n M
M[ 0 ] [ 0 ] = A [ 0 ] [ 2 ] ;
M[ 0 ] [ 1 ] = A [ 0 ] [ 3 ] ;
M[ 1 ] [ 0 ] = A [ 1 ] [ 2 ] ;
M[ 1 ] [ 1 ] = A [ 1 ] [ 3 ] ;
}
# e n d i f /∗ MIXER GF H ∗ /
E.1.3 SboxGF.h
This code was written by Christopher Wood as part of his thesis work in [33]; we merely condensed
it for brevity here.
/∗∗
∗ Author : C h r i s t o p h e r A . Wood , caw4567@rit . edu
∗
∗ M o d i f i e d by Matt K e l l y i n June 2014 f o r b r e v i t y .
∗ /
# i f n d e f SBOXGF H
# d e f i n e SBOXGF H
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# i n c l u d e <s t d i n t . h>
# i n c l u d e <s t d i o . h>
/ / Q u o t i e n t and rema inder s t r u c t
t y p e d e f s t r u c t
{
u i n t 1 6 t q ;
u i n t 1 6 t r ;
u i n t 8 t e r r o r ;
} QR;
/ / B i t masks f o r t h e MSB and LSB
# d e f i n e MSB 16 0 x8000
# d e f i n e HMSB 16 0 x10000
# d e f i n e LSB 0x1
/ / S t a n d a r d d e f i n i t i o n s ( f o r sbox16 . c )
# d e f i n e PX 16 0x002B
# d e f i n e FPX 16 0x1002B
u i n t 1 6 t g16 add ( u i n t 1 6 t x , u i n t 1 6 t y )
{
re turn x ˆ y ;
}
u i n t 1 6 t g16 sub ( u i n t 1 6 t x , u i n t 1 6 t y )
{
re turn x ˆ y ;
}
u i n t 1 6 t g16 mul ( u i n t 1 6 t x , u i n t 1 6 t y )
{
u i n t 1 6 t accum = 0 ;
u i n t 1 6 t msb = 0 ;
u i n t 1 6 t i ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 1 6 ; i ++)
{
i f ( y & LSB) accum ˆ= x ;
msb = ( x & MSB 16 ) ; / / f e t c h t h e MSB
x <<= 1 ;
i f ( msb ) x ˆ= PX 16 ;
y >>= 1 ;
}
re turn accum ;
}
/∗∗
∗ P o l y n o m i a l d i v i s i o n i n GF ( 2 ˆ 1 6 ) .
∗ /
QR g 1 6 d i v ( u i n t 3 2 t a i , u i n t 1 6 t b )
{
u i n t 1 6 t a = ( u i n t 1 6 t ) a i ;
i n t msb = MSB 16 ;
i n t d = 0 ;
QR r e s u l t = {0 , 0} ;
/ / A l i g n t h e denomina tor w i t h t h e numera tor
whi le ( b > 0 && ! ( b & MSB 16 ) ) {
++d ;
b <<= 1 ;
}
/ / I f t h e p o l y n o m i a l MSB i s s e t (17 t h b i t ) , i n c r e m e n t
/ / t h e q u o t i e n t and r ed uc e t h e numera tor .
i f ( a i & HMSB 16 ) {
r e s u l t . q ˆ= 1 << ( d + 1 ) ;
a ˆ= b << 1 ;
}
f o r ( ; d > −1; d−−) {
i f ( ( a & msb ) && ( b & msb ) ) {
r e s u l t . q ˆ= 1 << d ;
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a ˆ= b ;
}
msb >>= 1 ;
b >>=1;
}
r e s u l t . r = a ;
re turn r e s u l t ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Modular i n v e r s e i n GF( 2 ˆ 1 6 ) u s i n g t h e EEA a l g o r i t h m .
∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t g 1 6 i n v ( u i n t 1 6 t x )
{
/ / T r i v i a l s p e c i a l c a s e s .
i f ( x == 0) re turn 0 ;
i f ( x == 1) re turn 1 ;
u i n t 1 6 t r0 = PX 16 ; / / rem [ i − 2]
u i n t 1 6 t r1 = x ; / / rem [ i − 1]
u i n t 1 6 t a0 = 0 ; / / aux [ i − 2]
u i n t 1 6 t a1 = 1 ; / / aux [ i − 1]
u i n t 1 6 t tmp ;
QR qr ;
i n t f i r s t R u n = 0 ;
whi le ( r1 > 0)
{
i f ( f i r s t R u n != 0) q r = g 1 6 d i v ( r0 , r1 ) ;
e l s e
{
qr = g 1 6 d i v ( FPX 16 , r1 ) ;
f i r s t R u n ++;
}
r0 = r1 ; r1 = qr . r ;
tmp = a0 ; a0 = a1 ;
a1 = g16 add ( tmp , g16 mul ( q r . q , a1 ) ) ;
}
re turn a0 ;
}
u i n t 1 6 t g 1 6 c h a n g e b a s i s ( u i n t 1 6 t x , u i n t 1 6 t∗ M)
{
i n t 3 2 t i ;
u i n t 1 6 t y = 0 ;
f o r ( i = 1 5 ; i >= 0 ; i−−)
{
i f ( x & 1) y ˆ= M[ i ] ;
x >>= 1 ;
}
re turn y ;
}
# e n d i f /∗ SBOXGF H ∗ /
E.1.4 Sbox16.h
This code was written by Christopher Wood as part of his thesis work in [33]; we merely condensed
it for brevity here.
/∗∗
∗ Author : C h r i s t o p h e r A . Wood , caw4567@rit . edu
∗
∗ M o d i f i e d by Matt K e l l y i n June 2014 f o r b r e v i t y .
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∗ /
# i f n d e f SBOXGF H
# d e f i n e SBOXGF H
# i n c l u d e <s t d i n t . h>
# i n c l u d e <s t d i o . h>
/ / Q u o t i e n t and rema inder s t r u c t
t y p e d e f s t r u c t
{
u i n t 1 6 t q ;
u i n t 1 6 t r ;
u i n t 8 t e r r o r ;
} QR;
/ / B i t masks f o r t h e MSB and LSB
# d e f i n e MSB 16 0 x8000
# d e f i n e HMSB 16 0 x10000
# d e f i n e LSB 0x1
/ / S t a n d a r d d e f i n i t i o n s ( f o r sbox16 . c )
# d e f i n e PX 16 0x002B
# d e f i n e FPX 16 0x1002B
u i n t 1 6 t g16 add ( u i n t 1 6 t x , u i n t 1 6 t y )
{
re turn x ˆ y ;
}
u i n t 1 6 t g16 sub ( u i n t 1 6 t x , u i n t 1 6 t y )
{
re turn x ˆ y ;
}
u i n t 1 6 t g16 mul ( u i n t 1 6 t x , u i n t 1 6 t y )
{
u i n t 1 6 t accum = 0 ;
u i n t 1 6 t msb = 0 ;
u i n t 1 6 t i ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 1 6 ; i ++)
{
i f ( y & LSB) accum ˆ= x ;
msb = ( x & MSB 16 ) ; / / f e t c h t h e MSB
x <<= 1 ;
i f ( msb ) x ˆ= PX 16 ;
y >>= 1 ;
}
re turn accum ;
}
/∗∗
∗ P o l y n o m i a l d i v i s i o n i n GF ( 2 ˆ 1 6 ) .
∗ /
QR g 1 6 d i v ( u i n t 3 2 t a i , u i n t 1 6 t b )
{
u i n t 1 6 t a = ( u i n t 1 6 t ) a i ;
i n t msb = MSB 16 ;
i n t d = 0 ;
QR r e s u l t = {0 , 0} ;
/ / A l i g n t h e denomina tor w i t h t h e numera tor
whi le ( b > 0 && ! ( b & MSB 16 ) ) {
++d ;
b <<= 1 ;
}
/ / I f t h e p o l y n o m i a l MSB i s s e t (17 t h b i t ) , i n c r e m e n t
/ / t h e q u o t i e n t and r ed uc e t h e numera tor .
i f ( a i & HMSB 16 ) {
r e s u l t . q ˆ= 1 << ( d + 1 ) ;
a ˆ= b << 1 ;
}
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f o r ( ; d > −1; d−−) {
i f ( ( a & msb ) && ( b & msb ) ) {
r e s u l t . q ˆ= 1 << d ;
a ˆ= b ;
}
msb >>= 1 ;
b >>=1;
}
r e s u l t . r = a ;
re turn r e s u l t ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Modular i n v e r s e i n GF( 2 ˆ 1 6 ) u s i n g t h e EEA a l g o r i t h m .
∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t g 1 6 i n v ( u i n t 1 6 t x )
{
/ / T r i v i a l s p e c i a l c a s e s .
i f ( x == 0) re turn 0 ;
i f ( x == 1) re turn 1 ;
u i n t 1 6 t r0 = PX 16 ; / / rem [ i − 2]
u i n t 1 6 t r1 = x ; / / rem [ i − 1]
u i n t 1 6 t a0 = 0 ; / / aux [ i − 2]
u i n t 1 6 t a1 = 1 ; / / aux [ i − 1]
u i n t 1 6 t tmp ;
QR qr ;
i n t f i r s t R u n = 0 ;
whi le ( r1 > 0)
{
i f ( f i r s t R u n != 0) q r = g 1 6 d i v ( r0 , r1 ) ;
e l s e
{
qr = g 1 6 d i v ( FPX 16 , r1 ) ;
f i r s t R u n ++;
}
r0 = r1 ; r1 = qr . r ;
tmp = a0 ; a0 = a1 ;
a1 = g16 add ( tmp , g16 mul ( q r . q , a1 ) ) ;
}
re turn a0 ;
}
u i n t 1 6 t g 1 6 c h a n g e b a s i s ( u i n t 1 6 t x , u i n t 1 6 t∗ M)
{
i n t 3 2 t i ;
u i n t 1 6 t y = 0 ;
f o r ( i = 1 5 ; i >= 0 ; i−−)
{
i f ( x & 1) y ˆ= M[ i ] ;
x >>= 1 ;
}
re turn y ;
}
# e n d i f /∗ SBOXGF H ∗ /
E.1.5 Permutation.h
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ The u n d e r l y i n g sponge p e r m u t a t i o n f .
∗
∗ Author : Matt K e l l y
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∗ Date : June 2014
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
# i f n d e f PERMUTATION H
# d e f i n e PERMUTATION H
# i n c l u d e ” S t a t e . h ”
# i n c l u d e ” Sbox16 . h ”
# i n c l u d e ” MixerGF . h ”
c l a s s P e r m u t a t i o n {
p r i v a t e :
i n t numRounds ;
c o n s t u i n t 1 6 t RC[ 1 6 ] [ 3 2 ] =
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 1 ) )
{{0x0019 , 0 x7a4f , 0 x5f1 f , 0 xf8c3 , 0 x56a7 , 0 x8f69 , 0 x21b5 , 0 xa6bf , 0 xbf71 , 0 xdf8d , 0 xbd31 , 0 x3fbc , 0 x5095 , 0 xa55d , 0 xe756 , 0 xbfa1 ,
0 xea72 , 0 x4069 , 0 x5005 , 0 x1492 , 0 x94f2 , 0 xa2e4 , 0 x19ae , 0 x251f , 0 xe2f7 , 0 xdbb6 , 0 x7c3b , 0 xb647 , 0 xc2ac , 0 x1be0 , 0 x5eec , 0 x7e f9 } ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 2 ) )
{0xac3b , 0 x6998 , 0 xac9c , 0 x5e2c , 0 x7ee8 , 0 x3300 , 0 x10a7 , 0 xb0f8 , 0 x7ac9 , 0 xdee7 , 0 xea54 , 0 x7d4d , 0 x8cd0 , 0 x0ab7 , 0 xad1b , 0 xd5f5 ,
0 x7f80 , 0 xaf2b , 0 xa711 , 0 xa9eb , 0 x137b , 0 x4e83 , 0 xb503 , 0 xd24c , 0 xd766 , 0 x5399 , 0 xa487 , 0 x34d4 , 0 x 7 f f f , 0 x324f , 0 xb745 , 0 x51e2} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 3 ) )
{0 xce4f , 0 xd406 , 0 x8e56 , 0 xeb07 , 0 xa6e7 , 0 x9d00 , 0 x7aed , 0 x4bc8 , 0 x257e , 0 x1082 , 0 x7c74 , 0 xee42 , 0 x2d82 , 0 xa29b , 0 x2ce8 , 0 xcb07 ,
0 x9fea , 0 xd81d , 0 x9df0 , 0 x513b , 0 xb577 , 0 xf3b6 , 0 xc478 , 0 x43b1 , 0 x7c96 , 0 x4e7f , 0 x f8 f4 , 0 x198f , 0 x3202 , 0 x7533 , 0 xeaf5 , 0 xbcc1} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 4 ) )
{0x5058 , 0 xcb97 , 0 x5975 , 0 x c e f f , 0 x027d , 0 x1326 , 0 x4889 , 0 x12e1 , 0 x99b7 , 0 x9b91 , 0 x6ad9 , 0 x0a3f , 0 xe2fd , 0 x0150 , 0 x8cd7 , 0 xd7c0 ,
0 x1bc8 , 0 xaaa4 , 0 xd21a , 0 x8473 , 0 xfb15 , 0 xf3b1 , 0 x51ab , 0 x9e44 , 0 x172e , 0 x9ccb , 0 x70a5 , 0 xea04 , 0 x495a , 0 xf3ec , 0 x03b5 , 0 x153e} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 5 ) )
{0x84da , 0 x272d , 0 x13a4 , 0 x4f08 , 0 x98ee , 0 x4ea5 , 0 x3334 , 0 xc255 , 0 xd894 , 0 xcc54 , 0 xd357 , 0 xc554 , 0 x66d7 , 0 x60de , 0 xbde4 , 0 x82a2 ,
0 x44c1 , 0 x28df , 0 x641e , 0 x8067 , 0 x3a8b , 0 xc34a , 0 x1620 , 0 xd880 , 0 xb796 , 0 x5e54 , 0 x9f31 , 0 x3ddc , 0 xcfd5 , 0 x06b0 , 0 x7341 , 0 x3b87} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 6 ) )
{0xbb93 , 0 xaaa2 , 0 x3b38 , 0 xea96 , 0 xc934 , 0 x6ef9 , 0 x1e18 , 0 x4982 , 0 xbf50 , 0 xe910 , 0 x33f4 , 0 x354e , 0 xcb20 , 0 xd3c7 , 0 x390c , 0 x2b41 ,
0 x862e , 0 x8825 , 0 xec3d , 0 x0fee , 0 x0a6f , 0 x9788 , 0 x81f9 , 0 x0728 , 0 xc674 , 0 x8e4a , 0 xed8b , 0 x7323 , 0 x5007 , 0 x5d6c , 0 x2bdd , 0 x8e4b} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 7 ) )
{0xfe32 , 0 xf3eb , 0 xa766 , 0 x26de , 0 xdf36 , 0 x622b , 0 xfdc5 , 0 xccd3 , 0 x3db2 , 0 xf3e0 , 0 xdd7c , 0 x3c12 , 0 x8298 , 0 xea78 , 0 xc1cc , 0 x7fee ,
0 x1a14 , 0 x0edb , 0 x8e57 , 0 xcd58 , 0 x24c7 , 0 xf4b8 , 0 x17c0 , 0 xfc94 , 0 xe70d , 0 xa5b9 , 0 x399f , 0 xaaf9 , 0 xa848 , 0 xa46a , 0 xd306 , 0 x79e9} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 8 ) )
{0x952b , 0 xa024 , 0 x86b8 , 0 x18fe , 0 xbc0e , 0 xc985 , 0 x59df , 0 x27c7 , 0 x9357 , 0 x838f , 0 x011b , 0 x1e5b , 0 xc11f , 0 x2cfb , 0 x6fc0 , 0 x573e ,
0x5459 , 0 x78c2 , 0 xbc5b , 0 x390f , 0 x4490 , 0 x7f8d , 0 xa0df , 0 xd682 , 0 x06fe , 0 x4521 , 0 xf86b , 0 xa6c8 , 0 x79ec , 0 x1e69 , 0 xcaed , 0 x9533} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 9 ) )
{0xb41e , 0 x6bb4 , 0 xed20 , 0 x2940 , 0 x1639 , 0 x9c26 , 0 x8da6 , 0 xbf88 , 0 xc89e , 0 x2dc1 , 0 x18a3 , 0 x61b3 , 0 x560e , 0 xe8da , 0 xed97 , 0 x3a8f ,
0x9778 , 0 xdf40 , 0 xe308 , 0 xc120 , 0 x6fa4 , 0 x2f97 , 0 xf3 fd , 0 x3f63 , 0 xd2b4 , 0 xb3b5 , 0 x7eb5 , 0 xbcbe , 0 xc6ad , 0 x64d4 , 0 x6216 , 0 xb692} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 1 0 ) )
{0x6954 , 0 xa418 , 0 xcecc , 0 x4363 , 0 x3bd5 , 0 x26c2 , 0 x499d , 0 xfc16 , 0 xb832 , 0 xf58b , 0 x216b , 0 x9a8b , 0 x226a , 0 x6a0b , 0 x7918 , 0 xd364 ,
0 xa793 , 0 x9004 , 0 x339d , 0 xe0ba , 0 x08e2 , 0 xb547 , 0 xe64d , 0 xc562 , 0 x2e24 , 0 xb0c4 , 0 x f8 f4 , 0 x15d9 , 0 xe0a8 , 0 x4cb9 , 0 x4b6c , 0 x 5 f 3 f } ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 1 1 ) )
{0x2e4b , 0 x9ad3 , 0 x7091 , 0 xe3e5 , 0 xa218 , 0 xc5e5 , 0 x7b33 , 0 xed34 , 0 x70ba , 0 x4f31 , 0 x f b c f , 0 x1642 , 0 x4684 , 0 xfdd5 , 0 xcde3 , 0 x8e88 ,
0 x9eae , 0 x3f01 , 0 x8b37 , 0 xaf58 , 0 xc24c , 0 xcc8a , 0 xf57a , 0 xbc2c , 0 x6911 , 0 x408d , 0 xd20e , 0 xf643 , 0 x5e44 , 0 x94a3 , 0 xe659 , 0 x9a06} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 1 2 ) )
{0xaa42 , 0 xaca7 , 0 x3bd7 , 0 xf8a1 , 0 x7e98 , 0 x7f28 , 0 x1422 , 0 xb266 , 0 xe44f , 0 x0de1 , 0 x615d , 0 x2d39 , 0 x3c62 , 0 x0c8c , 0 x5a2c , 0 x80b4 ,
0 xf061 , 0 x78c8 , 0 x455b , 0 xf981 , 0 x7960 , 0 x3f2 f , 0 x1bcb , 0 x30b2 , 0 x559f , 0 x282c , 0 x799e , 0 x4053 , 0 x3b06 , 0 x65f9 , 0 x7a2a , 0 x706a} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 1 3 ) )
{0x969c , 0 x39ae , 0 x2dc1 , 0 x6834 , 0 x3103 , 0 x44c0 , 0 x579d , 0 x0f fd , 0 xfde0 , 0 x1772 , 0 xdbf9 , 0 xa4ca , 0 xb984 , 0 x953c , 0 x395d , 0 x7791 ,
0x1510 , 0 xf39e , 0 x5f37 , 0 x295e , 0 x3611 , 0 xa1d4 , 0 x6101 , 0 x460d , 0 xaf73 , 0 x1ddb , 0 xdab1 , 0 xec1b , 0 xbc51 , 0 x2edc , 0 x4468 , 0 x0d8d} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 1 4 ) )
{0x8a1e , 0 x6ce3 , 0 x1f0b , 0 x526d , 0 x884b , 0 x584a , 0 xa1a5 , 0 xae42 , 0 x94fc , 0 x f85f , 0 xd2e5 , 0 x25f9 , 0 x59ed , 0 x1a54 , 0 x2333 , 0 x59c7 ,
0 xc5fe , 0 xce6d , 0 x2477 , 0 x5e7d , 0 x4a9a , 0 xd97c , 0 x2632 , 0 xa3be , 0 x5b33 , 0 x1a8f , 0 x580f , 0 x557b , 0 x269e , 0 x7b65 , 0 x123a , 0 x5992} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 1 5 ) )
{0x9bd6 , 0 x4a93 , 0 x2f09 , 0 x672d , 0 xef04 , 0 xb6a9 , 0 x4753 , 0 xa3e4 , 0 x087a , 0 x1c38 , 0 x9507 , 0 x8dc7 , 0 x0927 , 0 xfcd7 , 0 x7488 , 0 x8dfd ,
0x400b , 0 x95fd , 0 x1c6a , 0 x0b2a , 0 x91a1 , 0 xba44 , 0 xeea0 , 0 x9f51 , 0 x63db , 0 xa4df , 0 xa9da , 0 x7b8e , 0 xb97d , 0 x791c , 0 xab56 , 0 x6437} ,
/ / SHA3−512( ASCII ( 1 6 ) )
{0x4840 , 0 x1f65 , 0 xc2d2 , 0 xd9e7 , 0 x1fe4 , 0 x7bd8 , 0 x0b28 , 0 xd834 , 0 xeee8 , 0 x f f f 3 , 0 xbe9a , 0 xa460 , 0 x8cba , 0 x33e6 , 0 xfedc , 0 xe0b1 ,
0 x693c , 0 x80cd , 0 xc36d , 0 xb7f5 , 0 x04e4 , 0 xabea , 0 x23cc , 0 xc672 , 0 x9a03 , 0 x0f5b , 0 x3e03 , 0 x5fb5 , 0 x9c2c , 0 x7882 , 0 x15cf , 0 x84a8}};
p u b l i c :
/∗∗
∗ C o n s t r u c t a p e r m u t a t i o n w i t h t h e g i v e n number o f rounds .
∗ /
P e r m u t a t i o n ( i n t numRounds )
{
numRounds = numRounds ;
}
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/∗∗
∗ Per forms s u b s t i t u t i o n u s i n g 16 x16−b i t S−box
∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t sub16 ( u i n t 1 6 t a )
{
re turn s b o x f o r w a r d ( a ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Per forms i n v e r s e s u b s t i t u t i o n u s i n g 16 x16−b i t S−box
∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t s u b 1 6 I n v e r s e ( u i n t 1 6 t a )
{
re turn s b o x i n v e r s e ( a ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Per forms a d d i t i o n modulo 65536 on two 16− b i t i n p u t s
∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t add ( u i n t 1 6 t a , u i n t 1 6 t b )
{
re turn ( u i n t 1 6 t ) ( ( ( u i n t 3 2 t ) ( a + b ) ) % 6 5 5 3 6 ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ R o t a t e l e f t by g i v e n amount
∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t r o t l ( u i n t 1 6 t a , i n t r o t C o n s t )
{
re turn ( ( a << r o t C o n s t ) | ( a >> (16 − r o t C o n s t ) ) ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ R o t a t e r i g h t by g i v e n amount
∗ /
u i n t 1 6 t r o t r ( u i n t 1 6 t a , i n t r o t C o n s t )
{
re turn ( ( a >> r o t C o n s t ) | ( a << (16 − r o t C o n s t ) ) ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Apply m ix ing f u n c t i o n based on m a t r i x m u l t i p l i c a t i o n i n GF
∗ /
void mix ( u i n t 1 6 t &a , u i n t 1 6 t &b )
{
u i n t 1 6 t a i n = a ;
u i n t 1 6 t M[ 2 ] [ 2 ] = {{0x0001 , 0 x0002} , {0x0002 , 0 x0003}};
a = g f m u l t i p l y ( a i n , M[ 0 ] [ 0 ] ) ˆ g f m u l t i p l y ( b , M[ 0 ] [ 1 ] ) ;
b = g f m u l t i p l y ( a i n , M[ 1 ] [ 0 ] ) ˆ g f m u l t i p l y ( b , M[ 1 ] [ 1 ] ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Apply i n v e r s e m ix ing f u n c t i o n based on m a t r i x m u l t i p l i c a t i o n i n GF
∗ /
void m i x I n v e r s e ( u i n t 1 6 t &a , u i n t 1 6 t &b )
{
u i n t 1 6 t a i n = a ;
u i n t 1 6 t M[ 2 ] [ 2 ] = {{0x0001 , 0 x0002} , {0x0002 , 0 x0003}};
g f 2 x 2 i n v e r s e (M) ;
a = g f m u l t i p l y ( a i n , M[ 0 ] [ 0 ] ) ˆ g f m u l t i p l y ( b , M[ 0 ] [ 1 ] ) ;
b = g f m u l t i p l y ( a i n , M[ 1 ] [ 0 ] ) ˆ g f m u l t i p l y ( b , M[ 1 ] [ 1 ] ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Perform a b i t w i s e p e r m u t a t i o n d e f i n e d by t h e a f f i n e f u n c t i o n
∗ p i ( x ) = a lpha ∗ x + b e t a
∗ where gcd ( alpha , 512) = 1 t o e n s u r e i n v e r t i b i l i t y .
∗ /
void p e r m u t e B i t s ( S t a t e &s t a t e , i n t a lpha , i n t b e t a )
{
S t a t e s t a t e C o p y ( s t a t e ) ;
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f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < WIDTH; ++ i ) {
i n t newIndex = ( a l p h a∗ i + b e t a ) & (WIDTH−1);
i f ( s t a t e C o p y . g e t B i t ( i ) )
s t a t e . s e t B i t ( newIndex ) ;
e l s e
s t a t e . c l e a r B i t ( newIndex ) ;
}
}
/∗∗
∗ Perform i n v e r s e b i t w i s e p e r m u t a t i o n d e f i n e d by t h e i n v e r s e a f f i n e f u n c t i o n
∗ p i ˆ{−1}(x ) = a l p h a I n v e r s e ∗ ( x − b e t a )
∗ /
void p e r m u t e B i t s I n v e r s e ( S t a t e &s t a t e , i n t a l p h a I n v e r s e , i n t b e t a )
{
S t a t e s t a t e C o p y ( s t a t e ) ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < WIDTH; ++ i ) {
/ / i & ( n−1) == i mod n f o r n power o f 2
i n t newIndex = ( a l p h a I n v e r s e ∗( i−b e t a ) ) & (WIDTH−1);
i f ( s t a t e C o p y . g e t B i t ( i ) )
s t a t e . s e t B i t ( newIndex ) ;
e l s e
s t a t e . c l e a r B i t ( newIndex ) ;
}
}
/∗∗
∗ P e r m u t a t i o n s t e p .
∗ /
void permute ( S t a t e &s t a t e )
{
p e r m u t e B i t s ( s t a t e , 31 , 1 5 ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ I n v e r s e p e r m u t a t i o n s t e p .
∗ /
void p e r m u t e I n v e r s e ( S t a t e &s t a t e )
{
p e r m u t e B i t s I n v e r s e ( s t a t e , 479 , 1 5 ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Add RC i t o t h e s t a t e .
∗ /
void addRC ( S t a t e &s t a t e , i n t roundNum )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < NUM WORDS; ++ i )
s t a t e [ i ] ˆ= RC[ roundNum ] [ i ] ;
}
/∗∗
∗ A forward round .
∗ /
void round ( S t a t e &s t a t e , i n t roundNum , bool v e r b o s e = f a l s e )
{
/ / S−box
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < NUM WORDS; ++ i )
s t a t e [ i ] = s b o x f o r w a r d ( s t a t e [ i ] ) ;
i f ( v e r b o s e ) {
p r i n t f ( ” A f t e r S−box :\n ” ) ;
s t a t e . p r i n t ( ) ;
}
/ / Permute
permute ( s t a t e ) ;
i f ( v e r b o s e ) {
p r i n t f ( ” A f t e r pe rmute :\n ” ) ;
s t a t e . p r i n t ( ) ;
}
/ / Mix
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i n t k = 0 ; / / Mixer number
f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; j < NUM WORDS; j += 2 )
mix ( s t a t e [ j ] , s t a t e [ j + 1 ] ) ;
i f ( v e r b o s e ) {
p r i n t f ( ” A f t e r mix :\n ” ) ;
s t a t e . p r i n t ( ) ;
}
/ / Add round c o n s t a n t
addRC ( s t a t e , roundNum ) ;
i f ( v e r b o s e ) {
p r i n t f ( ” A f t e r addRC :\n ” ) ;
s t a t e . p r i n t ( ) ;
}
}
/∗∗
∗ An i n v e r s e round .
∗ /
void r o u n d I n v e r s e ( S t a t e &s t a t e , i n t roundNum , bool v e r b o s e = f a l s e )
{
/ / Add round c o n s t a n t
addRC ( s t a t e , roundNum ) ;
i f ( v e r b o s e ) {
p r i n t f ( ” A f t e r addRC i n v e r s e :\n ” ) ;
s t a t e . p r i n t ( ) ;
}
/ / Mix i n v e r s e
i n t k = 0 ; / / Mixer number
f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; j < NUM WORDS; j += 2 )
m i x I n v e r s e ( s t a t e [ j ] , s t a t e [ j + 1 ] ) ;
i f ( v e r b o s e ) {
p r i n t f ( ” A f t e r m i x I n v e r s e :\n ” ) ;
s t a t e . p r i n t ( ) ;
}
/ / Permute i n v e r s e
p e r m u t e I n v e r s e ( s t a t e ) ;
i f ( v e r b o s e ) {
p r i n t f ( ” A f t e r pe rmute i n v e r s e :\n ” ) ;
s t a t e . p r i n t ( ) ;
}
/ / S−box i n v e r s e
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < NUM WORDS; ++ i )
s t a t e [ i ] = s b o x i n v e r s e ( s t a t e [ i ] ) ;
i f ( v e r b o s e ) {
p r i n t f ( ” A f t e r S−box i n v e r s e :\n ” ) ;
s t a t e . p r i n t ( ) ;
}
}
/∗∗
∗ Run t h e forward p e r m u t a t i o n .
∗ /
void f o r w a r d ( S t a t e &s t a t e , bool v e r b o s e = f a l s e )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < numRounds ; ++ i )
round ( s t a t e , i , v e r b o s e ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Run t h e i n v e r s e p e r m u t a t i o n .
∗ /
void i n v e r s e ( S t a t e &s t a t e , bool v e r b o s e = f a l s e )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < numRounds ; ++ i )
r o u n d I n v e r s e ( s t a t e , numRounds − i − 1 , v e r b o s e ) ;
}
} ; / / P e r m u t a t i o n
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# e n d i f /∗ PERMUTATION H ∗ /
E.1.6 Sponge.h
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ The s i m p l i f i e d sponge c o n s t r u c t i o n .
∗ Padding , i f n e c e s s a r y , i s assumed t o be done a t some
∗ h i g h e r l e v e l i n t h e o v e r a l l s y s t e m .
∗
∗ Author : Matt K e l l y
∗ Date : June 2014
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
# i f n d e f SPONGE H
# d e f i n e SPONGE H
# i n c l u d e <a s s e r t . h>
# i n c l u d e ” S t a t e . h ”
# i n c l u d e ” P e r m u t a t i o n . h ”
c l a s s Sponge {
p r i v a t e :
S t a t e s t a t e ;
P e r m u t a t i o n f ;
p u b l i c :
/∗
∗ C o n s t r u c t a new Sponge w i t h t h e g i v e n number o f rounds .
∗ /
Sponge ( i n t numRounds )
: f ( numRounds ) {}
/∗∗
∗ Absorb i n p u t da ta .
∗ A s s u m p t i o n s : i n p u t a r r a y i s c o r r e c t s i z e
∗ i n p u t i s a m u l t i p l e o f r = 128
∗ /
void a b s o r b ( u i n t 1 6 t i n p u t [ ] , i n t numWords )
{
a s s e r t ( numWords % 8 == 0 ) ;
i n t o f f s e t = 0 ;
whi le ( numWords > 0 ) {
s t a t e . x o r O u t e r S t a t e (& i n p u t [ o f f s e t ] ) ;
f . f o r w a r d ( s t a t e ) ;
numWords −= 8 ;
o f f s e t += 8 ;
}
}
/∗∗
∗ Squeeze o u t p u t da ta t o d e s i r e d l e n g t h .
∗ Assumpt ion : o u t p u t a r r a y i s c o r r e c t s i z e
∗ /
void s q u e e z e ( u i n t 1 6 t o u t p u t [ ] , i n t numWords ) {
/ / We can t a k e r = 128 b i t s (8 words ) per s q u e e z e
/ / a f t e r t h e f i r s t 128 b i t s
i f ( numWords <= 8 ) {
s t a t e . copy ( o u t p u t , numWords , 0 ) ;
} e l s e {
/ / F i r s t 8 words
s t a t e . copy ( o u t p u t , 8 , 0 ) ;
numWords −= 8 ;
i n t o f f s e t = 8 ;
whi le ( numWords >= 8 ) {
f . f o r w a r d ( s t a t e ) ;
s t a t e . copy ( o u t p u t , 8 , o f f s e t ) ;
numWords −= 8 ;
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o f f s e t += 8 ;
}
/ / L e f t o v e r
i f ( numWords > 0 ) {
f . f o r w a r d ( s t a t e ) ;
s t a t e . copy ( o u t p u t , numWords , o f f s e t ) ;
}
}
}
} ; /∗ SPONGE H ∗ /
# e n d i f
E.1.7 Duplex.h
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ The s i m p l i f i e d d u p l e x c o n s t r u c t i o n .
∗ Padding and domain s e p a r a t i o n ( f rame b i t h a n d l i n g ) , i f n e c e s s a r y ,
∗ are assumed t o be done a t some h i g h e r l e v e l i n t h e o v e r a l l s y s t e m .
∗
∗ Author : Matt K e l l y
∗ Date : June 2014
∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
# i f n d e f DUPLEX H
# d e f i n e DUPLEX H
# i n c l u d e ” Sponge . h ”
c l a s s Duplex {
p r i v a t e :
Sponge s p o ng e ;
i n t k e y S i z e ;
i n t i s I n i t i a l i z e d ;
p u b l i c :
/∗∗
∗ C o n s t r u c t a new Duplex o b j e c t w i t h t h e g i v e n key s i z e .
∗ /
Duplex ( i n t keySize , i n t numRounds )
: s p o n ge ( numRounds )
{
a s s e r t ( k e y S i z e == 128 | | k e y S i z e == 2 5 6 ) ;
k e y S i z e = k e y S i z e ;
i s I n i t i a l i z e d = 0 ;
}
/∗∗
∗ S e t t h e key by a b s o r b i n g i t w i t h a mute c a l l .
∗ /
void se tKey ( u i n t 1 6 t key [ ] )
{
i n t numWords = k e y S i z e / 1 6 ;
s p o ng e . a b s o r b ( key , numWords ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ S e t t h e IV by a b s o r b i n g i t w i t h a mute c a l l .
∗ /
void s e t I V ( u i n t 1 6 t i v [ 8 ] )
{
s p o ng e . a b s o r b ( iv , 8 ) ;
}
/∗∗
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∗ S e t t h e key and IV w i t h two mute c a l l s .
∗ /
void i n i t i a l i z e ( u i n t 1 6 t key [ ] , u i n t 1 6 t i v [ 8 ] )
{
se tKey ( key ) ;
s e t I V ( i v ) ;
i s I n i t i a l i z e d = 1 ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Duplex ing c a l l :
∗ I n p u t may be any s i z e , i n c l u d i n g 0
∗ Outpu t may be any s i z e , i n c l u d i n g 0
∗ A s s u m p t i o n s : s igma i s c o r r e c t s i z e
∗ s igma i s m u l t i p l e o f r = 128
∗ z i s c o r r e c t s i z e
∗ /
void d u p l e x i n g ( u i n t 1 6 t s igma [ ] , i n t s igmaSize , u i n t 1 6 t z [ ] , i n t z S i z e )
{
a s s e r t ( i s I n i t i a l i z e d ) ;
i f ( s i g m a S i z e > 0 )
s p o n ge . a b s o r b ( sigma , s i g m a S i z e ) ;
i f ( z S i z e > 0 )
s p o n ge . s q u e e z e ( z , z S i z e ) ;
}
} ; / / Duplex
# e n d i f
E.1.8 TestPermutation.cpp
# i n c l u d e <s t d i o . h>
# i n c l u d e <s t d l i b . h> /∗ e x i t ∗ /
# i n c l u d e ” S t a t e . h ”
# i n c l u d e ” P e r m u t a t i o n . h ”
# d e f i n e NUM ROUNDS 16 / / d e f a u l t number o f rounds
/∗∗
∗ Check f o r a v a l a n c h e c r i t e r i o n over i n c r e a s i n g
∗ numbers o f rounds
∗ /
void t e s t A v a l a n c h e C r i t e r i o n ( i n t maxRounds )
{
f o r ( i n t round = 1 ; round <= maxRounds ; ++ round ) {
P e r m u t a t i o n f ( round ) ;
S t a t e z e r o S t a t e I n ;
S t a t e r e f S t a t e O u t ;
f . f o r w a r d ( r e f S t a t e O u t ) ;
f l o a t hdAvg = 0 ;
i n t hdMax = 0 ;
i n t hdMin = 512 ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < WIDTH; ++ i ) {
S t a t e s t a t e I n ( z e r o S t a t e I n ) ;
s t a t e I n . s e t B i t ( i ) ;
S t a t e s t a t e O u t = S t a t e ( s t a t e I n ) ;
f . f o r w a r d ( s t a t e O u t ) ;
i n t hd = r e f S t a t e O u t . ge tHammingDis tance ( s t a t e O u t ) ;
hdAvg += hd ;
i f ( hd > hdMax ) hdMax = hd ;
i f ( hd < hdMin ) hdMin = hd ;
}
hdAvg /= 512 ;
p r i n t f ( ”−−−− %2d ro un ds −−−−\n\n ” , round ) ;
p r i n t f ( ”Avg HD: %.2 f\n ” , hdAvg ) ;
p r i n t f ( ”Max HD: %d\n ” , hdMax ) ;
p r i n t f ( ”Min HD: %d\n\n ” , hdMin ) ;
}
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}
/∗∗
∗ Keep f l i p p i n g a b i t o f t h e i n i t i a l s t a t e and comput ing t h e
∗ f o rward and i n v e r s e p e r m u t a t i o n s .
∗ I f a l l o f t h e s e t e s t s pass , we have h igh c o n f i d e n c e t h a t t h e
∗ t h e fo rward and i n v e r s e p e r m u t a t i o n s are c o r r e c t .
∗ /
void o n e O f f I n v e r s e ( )
{
S t a t e s t a t e ;
P e r m u t a t i o n f (NUM ROUNDS) ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 512 ; ++ i ) {
f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; j <= i ; ++ j )
s t a t e . s e t B i t ( j ) ;
S t a t e s t a t e C o p y = S t a t e ( s t a t e ) ;
f . f o r w a r d ( s t a t e C o p y , f a l s e ) ;
f . i n v e r s e ( s t a t e C o p y , f a l s e ) ;
i f ( s t a t e C o p y != s t a t e ) {
p r i n t f ( ”ERROR: s t a t e s do n o t match :\n\n ” ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” I n i t i a l s t a t e :\n ” ) ;
s t a t e . p r i n t ( ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” F i n a l s t a t e ( a f t e r round and r o u n d I n v e r s e ) :\ n ” ) ;
s t a t e C o p y . p r i n t ( ) ;
e x i t ( 1 ) ;
}
s t a t e . c l e a r A l l ( ) ;
}
s t a t e . s e t A l l ( ) ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 512 ; ++ i ) {
f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; j <= i ; ++ j )
s t a t e . c l e a r B i t ( j ) ;
S t a t e s t a t e C o p y = S t a t e ( s t a t e ) ;
f . f o r w a r d ( s t a t e C o p y , f a l s e ) ;
f . i n v e r s e ( s t a t e C o p y , f a l s e ) ;
i f ( s t a t e C o p y != s t a t e ) {
p r i n t f ( ”ERROR: s t a t e s do n o t match :\n\n ” ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” I n i t i a l s t a t e :\n ” ) ;
s t a t e . p r i n t ( ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” F i n a l s t a t e ( a f t e r round and r o u n d I n v e r s e ) :\ n ” ) ;
s t a t e C o p y . p r i n t ( ) ;
e x i t ( 1 ) ;
}
s t a t e . s e t A l l ( ) ;
}
p r i n t f ( ” A l l i n v e r s e t e s t s p a s s e d !\n ” ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Run t e s t s .
∗ /
i n t main ( )
{
o n e O f f I n v e r s e ( ) ;
t e s t A v a l a n c h e C r i t e r i o n (NUM ROUNDS) ;
}
E.1.9 DuplexKAT.cpp
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ G e n e r a t e s Known Answer T e s t s ( KATs ) f o r t h e Duplex c o n s t r u c t i o n .
∗
∗ Author : Matt K e l l y
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∗ Date : June 2014
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
# i n c l u d e ” Duplex . h ”
/∗∗
∗ P r i n t word a r r a y w i t h n i c e f o r m a t t i n g
∗ /
void p r i n t W o r d s ( u i n t 1 6 t a r r [ ] , i n t numWords , FILE ∗o u t = s t d o u t )
{
i f ( numWords == 0 )
f p r i n t f ( out , ” ( empty )\n ” ) ;
e l s e {
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < numWords ; ++ i ) {
i f ( i == 0 ) f p r i n t f ( out , ” ” ) ;
i f ( i > 0 && i % 8 == 0 ) f p r i n t f ( out , ”\n ” ) ;
f p r i n t f ( out , ”%04hx ” , a r r [ i ] ) ;
}
f p r i n t f ( out , ”\n ” ) ;
}
}
/∗∗
∗ XOR a r r a y s A and B t o g e t h e r , o u t p u t t i n g i n D
∗ /
void x o r A r r a y s ( u i n t 1 6 t A[ ] , u i n t 1 6 t B [ ] , u i n t 1 6 t D[ ] , i n t numWords )
{
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < numWords ; ++ i ) D[ i ] = A[ i ] ˆ B[ i ] ;
}
/∗∗
∗ P r i n t a s i n g l e KAT based on i n p u t da ta .
∗ IVs are r e s t r i c t e d t o 128 b i t s f o r s i m p l i c i t y .
∗ /
void genKAT ( u i n t 1 6 t key [ ] , i n t keySize , u i n t 1 6 t i v [ 8 ] ,
u i n t 1 6 t A[ ] , i n t headSize , u i n t 1 6 t B [ ] , i n t bodySize ,
i n t t a g S i z e )
{
u i n t 1 6 t CT[ bodySize ] ; / / C i p h e r t e x t
u i n t 1 6 t T [ 8 ] ; / / Tag
u i n t 1 6 t Z [ bodySize ] ; / / Dup lex ing o u t p u t
a s s e r t ( k e y S i z e == 128 | | k e y S i z e == 2 5 6 ) ;
/ / I n i t i a l i z e a new Duplex o b j e c t
Duplex D( keySize , k e y S i z e == 128 ? 10 : 1 6 ) ; / / 128− b i t key u s e s 10 rounds
D. i n i t i a l i z e ( key , i v ) ;
/ / Absorb header and g e n e r a t e k e y s t r e a m
D. d u p l e x i n g (A, headS ize , Z , bodySize ) ;
/ / XOR o u t p u t w i t h body t o p r o d u c t c i p h e r t e x t
x o r A r r a y s ( Z , B , CT , bodySize ) ;
/ / Absorb body and g e n e r a t e t a g
D. d u p l e x i n g (B , bodySize , T , t a g S i z e ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” #####################################\n ” ) ;
p r i n t f ( ”Key :\n ” ) ;
p r i n t W o r d s ( key , k e y S i z e / 1 6 ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” IV :\n ” ) ;
p r i n t W o r d s ( iv , 8 ) ;
p r i n t f ( ”A ( h e a d e r ) :\ n ” ) ;
p r i n t W o r d s (A, h e a d S i z e ) ;
p r i n t f ( ”B ( body ) :\ n ” ) ;
p r i n t W o r d s (B , bodySize ) ;
p r i n t f ( ”CT:\n ” ) ;
p r i n t W o r d s (CT , bodySize ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” Tag :\n ” ) ;
p r i n t W o r d s ( T , t a g S i z e ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” #####################################\n\n ” ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Genera te a l l KATs f o r 128− b i t key
∗ /
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void genKAT 128 ( ) {
u i n t 1 6 t i v [ 8 ] = {0}; / / IV c o u l d be any l e n g t h , b u t 128− b i t i s c o n v e n i e n t
u i n t 1 6 t key [ 8 ] = {0}; / / 128− b i t key
u i n t 1 6 t A[ 6 4 ] = {0}; / / Header
u i n t 1 6 t B[ 6 4 ] = {0}; / / Body
genKAT ( key , 128 , iv , A, 16 , B , 32 , 8 ) ;
genKAT ( key , 128 , iv , A, 32 , B , 64 , 8 ) ;
genKAT ( key , 128 , iv , A, 0 , B , 16 , 8 ) ;
/ / F l i p a b i t o f t h e key
u i n t 1 6 t key2 [ 8 ] = {0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0x0000 ,
0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0 x0001} ;
genKAT ( key2 , 128 , iv , A, 0 , B , 16 , 8 ) ;
u i n t 1 6 t key3 [ 8 ] = {0xa110 , 0 xc8b0 , 0 x1dc0 , 0 x f f e e ,
0 xdea1 , 0 x10c8 , 0 xa11d , 0 x e c a f } ;
u i n t 1 6 t i v 2 [ 8 ] = {0x1234 , 0x5678 , 0x9012 , 0x3456 ,
0x7890 , 0x1234 , 0x5678 , 0 x9012} ;
u i n t 1 6 t B2 [ 8 ] = {0xb0a7 , 0 x10ad , 0 x50fc , 0 x0c0a ,
0 x5ca1 , 0 xab1e , 0 xca55 , 0 xe77e } ;
genKAT ( key3 , 128 , iv2 , A, 0 , B2 , 8 , 8 ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Genera te a l l KATs f o r 256− b i t key
∗ /
void genKAT 256 ( ) {
u i n t 1 6 t i v [ 8 ] = {0}; / / IV c o u l d be any l e n g t h , b u t 128− b i t i s c o n v e n i e n t
u i n t 1 6 t key [ 1 6 ] = {0}; / / 256− b i t key
u i n t 1 6 t A[ 6 4 ] = {0}; / / Header
u i n t 1 6 t B[ 6 4 ] = {0}; / / Body
genKAT ( key , 256 , iv , A, 16 , B , 32 , 8 ) ;
genKAT ( key , 256 , iv , A, 32 , B , 64 , 8 ) ;
genKAT ( key , 256 , iv , A, 0 , B , 16 , 8 ) ;
/ / F l i p a b i t o f t h e key
u i n t 1 6 t key2 [ 1 6 ] = {0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0x0000 ,
0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0x0000 ,
0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0x0000 ,
0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0x0000 , 0 x0001} ;
genKAT ( key2 , 256 , iv , A, 0 , B , 16 , 8 ) ;
u i n t 1 6 t key3 [ 1 6 ] = {0xa110 , 0 xc8b0 , 0 x1dc0 , 0 x f f e e ,
0 xdea1 , 0 x10c8 , 0 xa11d , 0 xeca f ,
0 xa110 , 0 xc8b0 , 0 x1dc0 , 0 x f f e e ,
0 xdea1 , 0 x10c8 , 0 xa11d , 0 x e c a f } ;
u i n t 1 6 t i v 2 [ 8 ] = {0x1234 , 0x5678 , 0x9012 , 0x3456 ,
0x7890 , 0x1234 , 0x5678 , 0 x9012} ;
u i n t 1 6 t B2 [ 8 ] = {0xb0a7 , 0 x10ad , 0 x50fc , 0 x0c0a ,
0 x5ca1 , 0 xab1e , 0 xca55 , 0 xe77e } ;
genKAT ( key3 , 256 , iv2 , A, 0 , B2 , 8 , 8 ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Genera te some KATs .
∗ /
i n t main ( )
{
genKAT 128 ( ) ;
genKAT 256 ( ) ;
}
E.2 Permutation Analyzer
”””
S i mp le t o o l f o r a n a l y z i n g p r o p e r t i e s o f b i t w i s e p e r m u t a t i o n s
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d e f i n e d by l i n e a r and a f f i n e f u n c t i o n s .
Au thor : Matt K e l l y
Date : June 2014
”””
# ! / u s r / b i n / env py t ho n
STATE SIZE = 512
NUM SBOXES = 32
NUM MIXERS = 16
SBOX SIZE = STATE SIZE / NUM SBOXES
MIXER SIZE = STATE SIZE / NUM MIXERS
def gcd ( a , b ) :
””” S im p l e GCD c o m p u t a t i o n ”””
whi le b != 0 :
( a , b ) = ( b , a % b )
re turn a
c l a s s B i t :
”””
A b i t k e e p s t r a c k o f i t s i n d e x h i s t o r y as i t
i s m o d i f i e d by t h e p e r m u t a t i o n .
”””
def i n i t ( s e l f , i n i t i a l I n d e x ) :
””” C o n s t r u c t a new b i t w i t h t h e g i v e n i n i t i a l i n d e x ”””
s e l f . i n i t i a l I n d e x = i n i t i a l I n d e x
s e l f . i n d i c e s = [ i n i t i a l I n d e x ]
s e l f . s bo xes = [ i n i t i a l I n d e x / / SBOX SIZE ]
s e l f . m ix e r s = [ i n i t i a l I n d e x / / MIXER SIZE ]
def g e t O r d e r ( s e l f ) :
””” Get t h e o r d e r o f t h i s b i t ”””
re turn s e l f . i n d i c e s [ 1 : ] . i n d e x ( s e l f . i n i t i a l I n d e x ) + 1
def r e s e t ( s e l f ) :
””” R e s e t t h i s b i t ”””
s e l f . i n d i c e s = [ s e l f . i n i t i a l I n d e x ]
c l a s s P e r m u t a t i o n :
”””
A p e r m u t a t i o n can e i t h e r be d e f i n e d by a l i n e a r or an
a f f i n e f u n c t i o n .
T h i s c l a s s k e e p s t r a c k o f i n f o r m a t i o n abou t t h e p e r m u t a t i o n .
”””
def i n i t ( s e l f , s i z e , pType , a l p h a = 0 , b e t a = 0 ) :
””” C o n s t r u c t a new l i n e a r or a f f i n e p e r m u t a t i o n ”””
i f pType not in [ ’ l i n e a r ’ , ’ a f f i n e ’ ] :
r a i s e TypeEr ro r ( ” I n v a l i d p e r m u t a t i o n t y p e ! ” )
s e l f . s i z e = s i z e
s e l f . pType = pType
s e l f . a l p h a = a l p h a
s e l f . b e t a = b e t a
s e l f . o r d e r = 0
s e l f . b i t s = [ B i t ( i ) f o r i in r a n g e ( s i z e ) ]
def s t r ( s e l f ) :
””” Get a s t r i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h i s p e r m u t a t i o n ”””
r e t S t r = ’ ’
f o r b i t in s e l f . b i t s :
r e t S t r += ”%3d : [ ” % b i t . i n i t i a l I n d e x
f o r i in r a n g e ( l e n ( b i t . i n d i c e s ) ) :
i f i == l e n ( b i t . i n d i c e s )−1:
r e t S t r += ”%3d (%d ) ” % ( b i t . i n d i c e s [ i ] , b i t . sbo xe s [ i ] )
e l s e :
r e t S t r += ”%3d (%d ) , ” % ( b i t . i n d i c e s [ i ] , b i t . s bo xe s [ i ] )
r e t S t r += ’ ]\n ’
re turn r e t S t r
def permute ( s e l f ) :
””” Perform t h e p e r m u t a t i o n ”””
done = F a l s e
o r d e r = 0
whi le not done and o r d e r < s e l f . s i z e :
done = True
i f s e l f . pType == ’ l i n e a r ’ :
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s e l f . pe rmuteL inea rOnce ( )
e l i f s e l f . pType == ’ a f f i n e ’ :
s e l f . pe rmuteAf f ineOnce ( )
o r d e r += 1
f o r b i t in s e l f . b i t s :
i f b i t . i n d i c e s [−1] != b i t . i n i t i a l I n d e x :
done = F a l s e
s e l f . o r d e r = o r d e r
def pe rmuteL inea rOnce ( s e l f ) :
””” Perform t h e l i n e a r p e r m u t a t i o n o n l y once ”””
f o r b i t in s e l f . b i t s :
# L a s t b i t does n o t g e t permuted f o r l i n e a r p e r m u t a t i o n
i f b i t . i n i t i a l I n d e x == s e l f . s i z e −1:
newIndex = b i t . i n i t i a l I n d e x
e l s e :
newIndex = s e l f . a l p h a ∗ b i t . i n d i c e s [−1] % ( s e l f . s i z e−1)
b i t . i n d i c e s . append ( newIndex )
b i t . s bo xe s . append ( newIndex / / NUM SBOXES)
b i t . m ix e r s . append ( newIndex / / NUM MIXERS)
def pe rmuteAf f ineOnce ( s e l f ) :
””” Perform t h e a f f i n e p e r m u t a t i o n o n l y once ”””
f o r b i t in s e l f . b i t s :
newIndex = ( s e l f . a l p h a ∗ b i t . i n d i c e s [−1] + s e l f . b e t a ) % s e l f . s i z e
b i t . i n d i c e s . append ( newIndex )
b i t . s bo xe s . append ( newIndex / / NUM SBOXES)
b i t . m ix e r s . append ( newIndex / / NUM MIXERS)
def ge tLowOrd e rB i t s ( s e l f ) :
””” Get a l l b i t s w i t h o r d e r l e s s than t h e p e r m u t a t i o n o r d e r ”””
l o w O r d e r B i t s = [ ]
f o r b i t in s e l f . b i t s :
o r d e r = b i t . g e t O r d e r ( )
i f o r d e r < s e l f . o r d e r :
l o w O r d e r B i t s . append ( b i t )
re turn l o w O r d e r B i t s
def g e t F i x e d P o i n t s ( s e l f ) :
””” Get a l l b i t s w i t h o r d e r 1 ”””
f i x e d P o i n t s = [ ]
f o r b i t in s e l f . b i t s :
i f b i t . g e t O r d e r ( ) == 1 :
f i x e d P o i n t s . append ( b i t )
re turn f i x e d P o i n t s
def hasMaxSboxSuccessors ( s e l f ) :
”””
Check i f t h i s p e r m u t a t i o n s e n d s a l l o u t p u t s o f e v e r y S−box t o
d i f f e r e n t S−boxes
”””
sb ox es = [ s e l f . b i t s [ i : i +SBOX SIZE ] f o r i in x ra ng e ( 0 , s e l f . s i z e , SBOX SIZE ) ]
f o r sbox in sb ox es :
n e x t S b o x e s = [ ]
f o r b i t in sbox :
n e x t S b o x e s . append ( b i t . s bo xe s [ 1 ] )
i f l e n ( s e t ( n e x t S b o x e s ) ) != SBOX SIZE :
re turn F a l s e
re turn True
def hasMaxMixerSuccesso r s ( s e l f ) :
”””
Check i f t h i s p e r m u t a t i o n s e n d s a l l o u t p u t s o f e v e r y S−box t o
d i f f e r e n t m i x e r s
”””
sb ox es = [ s e l f . b i t s [ i : i +SBOX SIZE ] f o r i in x ra ng e ( 0 , s e l f . s i z e , SBOX SIZE ) ]
f o r sbox in sb ox es :
n e x t M i x e r s = [ ]
f o r b i t in sbox :
n e x t M i x e r s . append ( b i t . m ixe r s [ 1 ] )
i f l e n ( s e t ( n e x t M i x e r s ) ) != SBOX SIZE :
re turn F a l s e
re turn True
def i sDe rangemen t ( s e l f ) :
””” T h i s p e r m u t a t i o n i s a derangement i f i t has no f i x e d p o i n t s ”””
re turn l e n ( s e l f . g e t F i x e d P o i n t s ( ) ) == 0
def r e s e t ( s e l f ) :
””” R e s e t a l l b i t s i n t h i s p e r m u t a t i o n ”””
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f o r b i t in s e l f . b i t s :
b i t . r e s e t ( )
def t e s t A l l L i n e a r ( ) :
””” A n a l y z e a l l p o s s i b l e l i n e a r f u n c t i o n s ”””
f o r a l p h a in r a n g e ( 2 , STATE SIZE ) :
i f gcd ( a lpha , STATE SIZE−1) == 1 :
p = P e r m u t a t i o n ( STATE SIZE , ’ l i n e a r ’ , a l p h a )
p . permute ( )
l o w O r d e r B i t s = p . ge tLowO rde rB i t s ( )
p r i n t ”\na = %d : Derange = %d , Order = %d , LowOrderBi ts = %d ,\
MaxSboxSucc = %d , MaxMixerSucc = %d\n ” % (
a lpha , p . i sDe rangemen t ( ) , p . o r d e r , l e n ( l o w O r d e r B i t s ) ,
p . hasMaxSboxSuccessors ( ) , p . hasMaxMixerSuccesso r s ( ) )
f o r b i t in l o w O r d e r B i t s :
p r i n t ”\ t%d ( o r d e r %d ) : %s ” % ( b i t . i n i t i a l I n d e x , b i t . g e t O r d e r ( ) , b i t . i n d i c e s )
def t e s t A l l A f f i n e ( ) :
””” A n a l y z e a l l p o s s i b l e a f f i n e f u n c t i o n s , assuming s t a t e s i z e i s a power o f 2 ”””
f o r a l p h a in r a n g e ( 1 , STATE SIZE , 2 ) :
f o r b e t a in r a n g e ( 1 , STATE SIZE ) :
p = P e r m u t a t i o n ( STATE SIZE , ’ a f f i n e ’ , a lpha , b e t a )
p . pe rmute ( )
l o w O r d e r B i t s = p . ge tLowO rde rB i t s ( )
p r i n t ”\na = %d , b = %d : Derange = %d , Order = %d , LowOrderBi ts = %d ,\
MaxSboxSucc = %d , MaxMixerSucc = %d\n ” % (
a lpha , be t a , p . i sDe rangemen t ( ) , p . o r d e r , l e n ( l o w O r d e r B i t s ) ,
p . hasMaxSboxSuccessors ( ) , p . hasMaxMixerSuccesso r s ( ) )
f o r b i t in l o w O r d e r B i t s :
p r i n t ”\ t%d ( o r d e r %d ) : %s ” % ( b i t . i n i t i a l I n d e x , b i t . g e t O r d e r ( ) , b i t . i n d i c e s )
def main ( ) :
# t e s t A l l L i n e a r ( )
t e s t A l l A f f i n e ( )
i f n a m e == ’ m a i n ’ :
main ( )
E.3 P-value Uniformity Test
”””
C a l c u l a t e s t h e u n i f o r m i t y o f p−v a l u e s f o r each t e s t
and p r i n t s numbers o f f a i l u r e s .
See h t t p : / / c s r c . n i s t . gov / groups / ST / t o o l k i t / rng / documents / SP800−22rev1a . p d f
S e c t i o n 4 . 2 . 2
Au thor : Matt K e l l y
Date : June 2014
”””
from s c i p y . s p e c i a l import gammainc
# I f p−v a l u e T < f a i l t h r e s h o l d , u n i f o r m i t y t e s t f a i l s
f a i l t h r e s h o l d = 0 .0001
f o r rnd in r a n g e ( 1 , 1 7 ) :
f a i l s = 0
r e p o r t f i l e = ” r e s u l t s−s t r eam128 / s t ream128−%drnd / f i n a l A n a l y s i s R e p o r t . t x t ” % rnd
wi th open ( r e p o r t f i l e ) a s f :
l i n e s = f . r e a d l i n e s ( ) [ 7 : 1 9 5 ] # Only grab r e l e v a n t l i n e s
f o r l i n e in l i n e s :
p v a l s = [ f l o a t ( v a l ) f o r v a l in l i n e . s p l i t ( ) [ 0 : 1 0 ] ]
sample s = sum ( p v a l s )
c h i s q = sum ( [ ( ( f l o a t ( p v a l s [ i ] ) − ( s amples /10 ) )∗∗2 / ( sample s / 1 0 ) ) f o r i in r a n g e ( l e n ( p v a l s ) ) ] )
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p v a l T = gammainc ( 4 . 5 , c h i s q / 2 )
i f p v a l T < f a i l t h r e s h o l d :
f a i l s += 1
p r i n t ”%2d ro un ds : %d u n i f o r m i t y f a i l u r e s ” % ( rnd , f a i l s )
